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PEREZ v. SHARP 
(32 C.Id 711: 188 P.2d 17) 
[I •. A. No. 20:305. In Bank~ Ort. 1, 1948.] 
711 
ANDHEA D. PEREZ et aI., Pl!titioners, v. W. O. SH..\UP, 
as County Clerk, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Religious Free¢om. 
-Ill view of the guaranwe of religious freedom in U- S. Const., 
Aml'nd. ~, stnte legislatures Ilre no more competent than 
Congr('ss to cnaet a law prohibiting lhe free exerci!"e of ro-
ligioll, though they may regulatE' cOLduct for the prowctioD 
of society, and insofar as their regulations are directed ~ 
wards n proper end and are not unreasonably discriminatory, 
they may indirectly affect religious activity without infring-
ing ~hc eonstitutional guarantee. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson, 
C. J., Carter, J.) 
[2] Marriage-Nature.-Marriage is so-uething more than R civil 
contract subject to regulation by the state; i~ is n fundllmental 
right of free men. There can be no proh~!Jition of marriage 
except for an important social objective and by reasonable 
means. 
[31 Id.-Legislative Control.-Legislation infringing on the right 
to marry must be based on more than prejudice and must be 
free from oppressive discrimination to comply with the con-
stitutional requirements (f due process and equal protection 
of the laws. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson,C. J., Carter, J.) 
[41 Id.-Validit1-M ... rriages Between Dift'erent Races.-A state 
law prohibiting members of one race from marrying members 
of another race is invalid unless it is designed to meet a clear 
RDd present peril arising out of an emergency. 
[5] Id.-Nature.-The right to marry ia !he right of individuals, 
Dot of racial groups. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson, C. J., Car-
ter, J.) 
[6] Id.-Legislative ControL-While disease that might become 
a prril to a prospective spouse or to the offspring of the mar-
riftl::(' could be made a disqualification for marriage, :egislation 
10 that t>ffect must be based on tests of the individual, not on 
arbitrary nlassifieations of groups or races, and must be ad-
ministered without discrimination on the grounds of raCle. 
(Pcr Traynor, J., Gibson, C. J .• Carter, J.) 
[1J See 5 Oal.Jur. 724; 11 Am.Jur.1l00. 
\ [2J See 16 Cal.Jur. 904; 35 Am.Jur. 182. 
MeX. Dig. References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 115; [2,5] Mar-
ringI', §l; [3, 6] Marriage, § 3; [4, 7, 8] Marriage, 119; [9] 
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[7] Id. - Validity - Marriages Between Dift'erent Raoos. - Civ. 
Code, §§ 60, 69, prohibiting man-illgcs between white persons 
and members of certain racial groups, are invalid because 
they discriminate against persons on the basis of race or 
color and are not designed to meet a clear and present danger. 
[8a, 8b] Id.-Validity-Marriages Between Dift'erent Races.-Civ. 
Code, §§ 60, 69, prohibiting marriages between white persons 
and members of certain racial groups, are invalid not only liS 
violating the equal protection clause of the federal Constitu-
tion and as arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating against 
certain racial groups, but also because they are too vague and 
uncertain to constitute a valid regulation. (Per Traynor, J., 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J.) 
[9] Statutes-Validity-OertaiDty.-The requirement that a law 
be definite and its meaning ascertainable by those whose 
rights and duties are governed thereby applies not only to 
penal statutes, but also to laws governing fundamental rights 
and liberties. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson, C .. T., Carter, J.) 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel county clerk to 
issue a certificate of registry and a license to marry. Writ 
granted. 
Daniel G. Marshall for Petitioners. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and 
Charles C. Stanley, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this proceeding in mandamus, peti-
tioners seek to compel the County Clerk of Los Angeles County 
to issue them a certificate of registry (Civ. Code, § 69a) and 
a license to marry. (Civ. Code, § 69.) In the application for 
a license, petitioner Andrea Perez states that she is a white 
person and petitioner Sylvester Davis that he is a Negro. 
Respondent refuses to issue the certificate and license, invoking 
Civil Code, section 69, which provides: ". . . no license may 
be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a 
Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race." 
Civil Code, section 69, implements Civij Code, section 60, 
which provides: " All marriages of white persons with negroes, 
Mongolians, members of the Mnlay race, or mulattoes are 
illegal and void." This section originally appeared in the 
Civil Code in 1872, but at that time it prohibited marriages 
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succeeded a statute prohibiting SUell lIIarriages and autllOriz· 
ing the imposition of cerlain criminal pI'nalties upon persons 
contracting or solemnizing them. (Stats. 1850, ch. 140, p. 424.) 
Since 1872, Civil Code, sectioll 60, hilS been twice amended. 
first to prohibit marriages betwe(,11 whitE' persons and Mon-
golians (Stats. 1901, p. 335) and subsequently to prohibit 
marriages between white persons and members of tbeMalay 
race. (Stat.'!. 1933, p. 561.) 
Petitioners contend that the statutes in question are uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that they prohibit the free exercise 
of their religion and deny to them the right to participate 
fully in the sacraments of that religion. They are members 
of the Roman Catholic Church. They maintain that since 
the church has no rule forbidding marriages between Negroes 
and Caucasians, they are entitled to receive the sacrament 
of matrimony. 
[1] The provision of the First A.mendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States that Congress shall make no 
law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof" is encompassed in the concept of 
liberty in the Fourteenth A.mendment. State legislatures 
are therefQre no more competent than Congress to enact such 
a law. (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 [60 S.Ct. 
900,84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352].) They may, however, 
regulate conduct for the protection of society, and insofar 
as their regulations are directed towards a proper end and 
are not unreasonably discriminatory, they may indirectly 
affect religious activity without infringing the constitutional 
guarantee. Although freedom of conscience and the freedom 
to believe are absolute, the freedom to act is not. (CantweU 
v. Connecticut, "'pra, at pp. 303-304.) 
The regulation of marriage is considered a proper func-
tion of the state. It is well settled that a legislature may 
declare monogamy to be the ulaw of social life under its 
dominion," even though such a law might inhibit the free 
exercise of certain religious practices. (Reynolds v. United 
8tates, 98 U.S. 145, 166 [25 L.Ed. 244]; Datlu v. Beason, 
133 U.S. 333, 343 [10 S.Ct. 299, 83 L.Ed. 637].) If the 
miscegenation law under attaek in the present proceediug 
is directed at a social evil and employs a reasonable means 
to prevent that evil, it is valid regardless of its incidental 
effect upon the conduct of particular religious groups. If, 
on the other hand, tnt' law is discriminatory and irratiollal, 
I 
I , ') 
I 
/ 
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it tmcoD,titu1iuDnlly restrict;; not only religious lib~rty but 
the liberty to DUlrry ac; well. 
The due proc(,~!l clau!;c of the Fourteent h Amendment 
prutects an arcn of pcr~oll:l.l liberty not yet wholly delimited. 
"While this Court h:t.., not attempted to define with exuctnf'~ 
the liberty thus gunranteed, t.he term has received much eon-
sidt:ration and some of the included things have been rldinitdy 
titntcd. Witbout doubt, it d.:notE's not merely frccrlolll frol1l 
bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to wn-
trnet, to r:n~ag(' in any of the common occnpation8 of lifc, 
to a('quire usl'ful knowled$!c, to marry, establish a hOlll(' anll 
brin~ up children, to worship God accordin~ to the dictates 
of hit> own consciencc, and, generally, to enjoy thosl~ privi-
le~rcs long r~co~nized at common law as essential to thc orderly 
purHuit of happiness by free men." (Italics addl:d; Mr;yer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 [43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042].) 
[2] Marria!!,\:! is thus something more than a civil contract 
8ubject to r~gulation by the state; it is a fundamental right 
of free men. There can be no prohibition of marria,:re eXcl'pt 
for an important social objective and by reasonable means. 
No law within the broad areas of state interest may be 
unreasonably discriminatory or arbitrary. The state's intpr-
est in public education, for example, does not empower the 
Legislature to compel 8chool children to rec<>ive instruction 
from public teachers only, for it would thereby take away the 
right of parents to "direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control." (Pierce v. Society of Sister" 
2G8 U.S. 510, 534-535 [45 8.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 
468] .) At.!llin, the state's vital concern in the prevention 
of crime Ilnd the mental health of its citizens docs not em-
power the Legislature to deprive "individuals of n ril!'ht 
which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have 
offspring" by authorizing thE' sterilization of criminals upon 
an arbitrary basis of classification and without a fair hearin~. 
(Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 [62 8. Ct. 1110, 
86 L.Ed.1655].p 
1 f;ct' also the conl'urring opinion of JllelI80n, J., indicating tbat 
etl'rilization of I'riminals as a hiological experimpnt. might be invalid: 
"There are limits to tb(' extent to which a il'gislatively represented 
mlljority may conduct biologi('al experiml'nts at the expense flf tho 
dignity Antl personality and nntural powers of a minority-even tboso 
who hn\'"c h(,pn guilty of what the majority define as crimes. But this 
Act falls down before reaching this problt'm, which I mention only to 
avoid the impli!':Jtioll tlillt SIlt'h n qu{'stion mllY not pxist hecaus(' not 
discl1l<s('d. On it 1 would also reserve judgmcnt." (31U U.S. 54U·GU; 
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'I'be right to marry is as fundamental as the right to send 
olle's chHd to a particular schoo] or the right to have offsprinf1;. 
Indeed, "We are dealing here with legislation which involves 
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation 
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race." (Skinner v. Oklahoma, mpra, at p. 541.) [3] Legislation 
infringing such rights must be based upon more than preju-
dice and must be frce from oppressive discrimination to comply 
with the constitutional requirements of due process and equal 
protection of the laws. 
I 
Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage 
with the person of one's choice, a statute that prohibits an 
individual from marrying a member of a race other than his 
own restricts the scope of his choice and thereby restricts his 
right to marry. It must therefore be determined whether the 
state can restrict that right on the basis of race alone without 
violating the equal protection of the laws clause of the United 
States Constitution . 
• , Distinctions between citizens solely because of their an-
cestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For 
that reason, legislative classification' or discrimination based on 
race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protec-
tion. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ot. 1064, 30 
L.Ed. 220) ; y" Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 [46 S.Ct. 
619, 70 L.Ed. 1059]; Bill v. Tuas, 316 U.S. 400 [62 S.Ot. 
1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559]." (Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81, 100 [63 S.Ot. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774].) In the Hira-
bayashi case the United States Supreme Court held that de-
spite the fact that under the Constitution of the United States 
"racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant 
and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in deal-
ing with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are 
wholly precluded from taking into account those facts. and 
circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national 
defense and for the successful prosecution of the war, and 
which may in fact place citizens of one ancestry in a different 
category from others. . . . The adoption by Government, in 
the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of measures for 
the public safet.y, based upon the recognition of facts and cir-
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traction may menace that safety more than others, is not 
wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be 
condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances 
racial distinctions are irrelevant. . . . The fact alone that at-
tack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather than 
another enemy power set these citizens apart from others wh() 
have no particular association with Japan." (320 U.S. 81, 
100-101.) Whether or not a state could base similar measures 
on the peril caused by a national emergency in the face of the 
equal protection of the laws clause of the United States Con-
stitution, which does not apply to the federal government, it 
clearly could not make such a distinction based on ancestry 
in the absence of an emergency. 
[4] A state law prohibiting m~bers of one race from 
marrying members of another race is not designed to ml.-ct 
a clear and present peril arising out of an emergency. In the 
absence of an emergency the state clearly cannot base a law 
impairing fundamental rights of individuals on general as-
sumptions as to traits of racial groups. It has been said that 
a statute such as section 60 does not discriminate against Imy 
racial group, since it applies alike to all persons whether 
Caucasian, Negro, or members of any other race. (In re 
EBtate 0/ Paquet, 101 Ore. 393, 399 [200 P. 911].) The de-
cisive question, however, is not whether different races, each 
considered as a group, are equally treated. [6] The right 
to marry is the right of individuals, not of racial groups. The 
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution does 
not refer to rights of the Negro race, the Caucasian race, or 
any other race, but to the rights of individuals. (State of 
Missouri e::e I'll. Gaines v. Oanada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 [598.Ct. 
232, 83 L.Ed. 208] ; McOabe v. Atchison, Topeka ct Santa Fe 
By. 00.,235 U.S. 151, 161-162 [35 S.Ot. 69, 59 L.Ed. 169].) 
In construing the equal protection of the laws clause of the 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has declared 
that the constitutionality of state action must be tested ac-
cording to whether the rights of an individual are restricted 
because of his race. Thus, in holding invalid state enforce-
ment of covenants restricting the occupation of real property 
on grounds of race, the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared: "The rights created by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the 
individual. It is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners 
to say that the courts may also be induced to deny white 
j 
) 
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persons righfs of oWIll'rr;hip and Ot!cuJlam~y on grounds of 
race or color. Erjual prol<'dioll of th(' lawfl is not achieved 
through indiscrimillaie illlpositioll of inequalities." (Skelley 
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 [68 S.Ct. 836, 846, 92 L.Ed. -].) 
In an earlier case, where a Negro contended that the state's 
failure to gh'e him equal facilities with others to' study law 
within the state impaired his constitutional rights under the 
equal protection clanse, the court rejected any consideration 
of the difference. of the demand for legal education among 
white persons and Negroes, stating: "Petitioner's ri'ght was 
a personal one. It was as an individual that he was entitled 
to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was. bound 
t.o furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education 
substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for 
persons of the white race, whether or not other negroes sought 
the same opportunity." (State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines 
v. Oanada, 305 U.S. 337, 851 [59 8.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208] ; 
8ipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 [68 S.Ct. 299, 92 
L.Ed. --J.) Similarly, with regard to the furnishing of sleep-
ing, dining, and chair car facilities on trains, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has held that even though there was 
less demand for such facilities among Negroes than among 
whites, the right of a member of the Negro race to substantially 
equal facilities was a right of the individual and not of the 
racial group:" It is the individual who is entitled to equal pro-
tection of the laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier, 
acting in the matter under the authority of a state law, a 
facility or convenience in the course of his journey which, 
under substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to 
another traveler, he may properly complain that his consti-
tutional privilege has been invaded." (McOabe v. Atckison, 
Topeka cf Santa Fe Railway 00., 235 U.S. 151, 161, 162 [35 
S.Ct. 69, 59 L.Ed. 169].) In these cases the United States 
Supreme Court determined that the right of an individual 
to be treated without discrimination because of his race can 
be met by separate facilities affording substantially equal 
treatment to the members of the different races. A holding 
that such segregation does not impair the right of an individ-
ual to ridE' on trains or to enjoy a legal education is clearly 
inapplicable to the right of an individual to marry. Since 
the essence of the right to marry is freedom to join in mar-
riage with the person of one's choice, a segregation statute for 
ma;riage necessarily impairs the right to marry. 
) 
) 
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[6] In determining whether the public interest requires 
thc prohibition of a marriage between two persolls, the st:lt, 
l!lny talte into consideration matters of legitimate concern to 
the state. Thus, disease that might become a peril to th(' 
prospc:ctive spouse or to the offspring of the marriage could 
be made a disqualification for marriage. (See for example, 
Civ. Code, §§ 79.01, 79.06.) Such legislation, however, must 
be based on tests of the individual, not on arbitrary classifi-
cations of groups or raCel;, and must be administered without 
discrimination on the grounds of race. (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 373 [6 8.Ct. 1064,30 L.Ed. 220].) It has been 
suggested that certain races are more prone than the Cau-
casian to diseases such as tuberculosis. If the state determines 
that certain diseases would endanger a marital partner or 
offspring, it may prohibit persons so diseased from marrying, 
but the statute must apply to all persons regardless of race. 
Sections 60 and 69 are not motivated by a concern to diminish 
the transmission of disease by marriage, for they make race 
and not disease the disqualification. Thus, a tubercular Negro 
or a tubercular Caucasian may marry subject to the race 
limitation, but a Negro and a Caucasian who are free from 
disease may not marry each other. If the purpose of these 
sections was to prevent marriages by persons who do not 
have the qualifications for marriage that the state may prop-
erly prescribe, they would make the possession of such quali-
fications the test for members of all races alike. By restrict-
ing the individual 'sright to marry on the basis of rnce alone, 
they violate the equal protection of the laws clause of the 
United Statp.s Constitution. 
II 
The parties, however, have argued at length the question 
whether the statute is arbitrary and unreasonable. They have 
assumed that under the equal protection clausc the stnte mny 
classify individuals according to their race in legislation rcl!U-
lating their fundamental rights. If it be assumed that fluch a 
classification can validly be made under the equal protection 
clause in circumstances besides those arising from an emer-
gency, the question would remain whether the statute's 
classification of racial groups is based on differences betwt't'n 
those groups bearing a substantial relation to a legitimate 
leS!'islative objective. (Barker Bros., Inc. v. Los Angeles, 10 
Cn1.2d 603, 609 r76 P.2d 97] ; G1Ilf etc. R. Co. v. Ellis, Hi5 
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Call Co. v. Pe1l'tlSylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 400 [48 S.Ct. 553, 
72 L.Ed. 927].} Race restrictions must be viewed with 
J!TC:lt llWlpicion, for the Fourteenth Amcndrnt'nt •• was adopted 
to prevent statc lCJriRlation desil.mcd to dil'lcriminl1te on the 
baBis of race or color" (Railway !lail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 32fi U.S. 
88, 94 [65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072]; Williams v.InteNta-
tional Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Ca1.2d 586, 590 [IGS 
P.2d 903]) and expresses "a definite national policy against 
discriminations because of race or color." (James v. Marin-
.hip Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 740 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 
900].) Any state legislation discriminating against persons 
on the basis of race or color has to overcome the strong prt-
sumption inherent in this constitutional policy. UOnly the 
most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination on 
that basis in the face of the equal protection clause . . ." 
(Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 [68 S.Ct. 269, 275,92 
L.Ed. --].) We shan therefore examine the ·history of the 
legislation in question and the arguments in its support to 
determine whether there are any exceptional circumstances 
IJUfficient to justify it. 
California's first miscegenation statute (Stats. 1850, ab. 
140, p. 424) was enacted at the same time as two other stat-
utes concerning race. It has been held that these three stat-
utes were in pari materia and therefore to be read together. 
(Estate of Stark, 48 Cal.App.2d 209, 214 [119 P.2d 961].) 
The two companion statutes provided: "No black or mulatto 
person. or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor 
of, or against, any white person. Every person who shall have 
one-eighth part or more of Negro blood shall be deemed a mu-
latto, Rnd every person who shall have one half of Indian 
blood shall be deemed an Indian." (Stats. 1850. ch. 99, § 14, 
p. 230; repealed Code Civ. Proc., § 18, 1872.) "No black, or 
mulatto person; or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence 
in any action to which a white person is a party, in any Court 
of this State. Every person who shall have one eighth part or 
more of negro blood, shall be deemed a mulatto; and every 
person who shall have one half Indian blood, shall be deemed 
an Indian." (Stats. 1850, ch. 142, § 306, p. 455; repealed Code 
Civ. Proc., § 18, 1872.) 
In 1854, -this court held that Chinese (and all others not 
whitt') WE're precluded from being witnesses against white 
persons 011 the basis of the st.ntlltt' qnotE'c1 above. (People v. 
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clSlon are candidly aet forth: • I The anomalous spectacle of 
a distinct people [Chinese}, living in our community, recog-
nizing no laws of thiR State except through necessity, bring-
ing with them their prejudices and national feuds, in which 
they indulge in open violation of law j whose mendacity is 
proverbial; a race of people whom nature has marked as in· 
ferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual 
development beyond a certanl point, as their history has 
shown; differing in languag~, opinions, color, and physical 
conformation j between whom and ourselves nature has placed 
an impassable difference, is now presented, and for them is 
claimed, not only the right to swear away the life of a citizen, 
but the further privilege of participating with us in adminis-
tering the affairs of our Government." (People v. HaU, 
,upra, at pp. 404-405.) For these reasons, therefore, "all 
races other than Caucasian" were held to be included in a 
statute referring only to a "black or mulatto person, or 
Indian." 
California courts are not alone in such utterances. Many 
courts in this country have assumed that. human beings can 
be judged by race and that other races are inferior to the 
Caucasian. Respondent's position is based upon those premo 
ises. He justifies the prohibition of miscegenation on grounds 
similar to those set forth in the frequently cited case of Scott 
Y. State (1869),39 Ga. 321, 324: "The amalgamation of the 
races is not only unnatural, but' is always productive of 
deplorable results. Our daily observation shows us, that 
the offspring of these unnatural connections are generally 
sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in physical 
development and strength, to the full blood of either race."· 
Modern experts are agreed that the progeny of marriages be-
tween persons of different races are not inferior to both par-
ents.- Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that inter· 
I Respondent refers to the following language ill StAte v. JGC'Ie.oa, 
80 Mo. 175, 1711 [50 Am.Rep .• 99), althougb stating that "we have 
not fuund an1 other atatement to bear out the biological elaima" 
therein: •• It is 8tat('d as a wt'lJ authenticated fact that if the issue of a 
black man IUld a white woman, and a white man and a blaek woman 
into)'marl1, they cannot pouibl1 have any procen1, and such a fact 
sufficiently justifies those JaWl which forbid the illterma.rria.p of 
blacks and 1\'bites, la1inl out of view other su1licient Irounda for auh 
enactments.' , 
" Sec, enstIe, Biological and Sociological Consequences of Raee Crt'S8-
ing. II Am. J. of Pbysi"al Antbrullology, pp. n5, 152,153; Linton, 
Stt'rlillg Pruf('ssor AntliropoJogy, Yale Uni.,. and PnlIIid('nt of the 
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racial marriage re.'1ults· in inferior progeny, we are unable 
to find any clear poliey in the statute against marriages on 
that ground. 
[7] Civil Code, section 60, like most miscegenation statutes 
(see, Vernier, American Family Laws, § 44), prohibits mar-
riages only between "white persons" and members of certain 
other so-called races. Although sectioll, 60 is more inclusive 
than most miscegenation statutes, it does not include • 'In-
dians" or "Hindus" (see, United States v. Bhaga' Singh 
TMnd, 261 U.S. 204, 214-215 [43 S.Ct. 338, 67 L.Ed. 616j); 
nor does it set up • 'Mexicans" as a separate category, although 
some authorities consider Mexico to be populated at least in 
part by persons who are a mixture of "white" and "Indian." 
(See, 15 Encyclopedia Britannica, pp. 381-382, 60 Harv.L. 
Rev. 1156-1158.) Thus, "white persons" may marry persons 
who would be considered other than white by respondent '. 
authorities, and all other "races" may intermarry freely. 
The Legislature therefore permits the mixing of all races 
with the single exception that white persons may not marry 
Negroes, Mongolians, mulattoes, or Malays. It might be con-
cluded therefrom that section 60 is based upon the theory 
that the progeny of a white person and a Mongolian or Negro 
or Malay are inferior or undesirable, while the progeny of 
members of otber di1rerent races are Dot. Nevertbeless, the 
section does not prevent the mixing of "white" and "colored" 
blood. It permits mamagt'S Dot only between Caucasians 
and others of darker pigmentation, such as Indians, Hindus, 
and Mexicans, but between persons of mixed ancestry includ-
ing white. If a person of partly Caucasian ancestry is yet 
classified as a Mongolian under section 60 because bis ancestry 
is predominantly Mongolian, a considerable mixture of Cau-
casian and Mongolian blood is permissible. A person ba\ing 
five-eighths Mongolian blood and three-eighths white blood 
could properly marry anotber person of preponderantly 
Mongolian blood. Similarly, a mulatto can marry a Negro. 
Under the theory of Estate of Stark, supra, that a mulntto 
is a person having one-eigbth or more of Negro ancestry. a 
person having seven-eighths white ancestry could marry a 
Negro. In f~ct two mulattoes, each of four-eighths white and 
four-eighths "Negro blood, could marry under section 60, and 
their progeny, like tJlem, would belong as much to one racc 
as to tile other. 1n t'fft>(·t. thl'r('for(', sCI·tion 60 pl!rmits a !' 







Caucasian ancestry Rnd members of other rll.c<."8. Further-
more, there is no b:m on illicit sc.~n!ll rcl:ltiollS between Cau-
casians and mcmbl~l'S of tbl! proscribed races. Indeed, it ill 
covertly (!D.cour8.llcd by the race restrictions on marrint;ru. 
Ncvcrthekss, respondent bn." sou/!ht to justify the 1'ItiltutC 
by contending that the prohibition of intcrm:lrri:\f:cbctwccn 
Caucasians and members of the specified races preVl!nts the 
Caucasian race from being contaminated by moc'S whose 
members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to 
Caucasians. 
Respondent submits statistics relating to the physical in-
feriority of certain races. Most, if not all, of the oilmtnts 
to which he refers are attributable largely to environmental 
factors. Moreover, one must take note of the statistics showing 
that there is a higher percentage ofeertain diseases among 
Caucasians than among non-Caucasians.' The categorical 
statement that non-Caucasians are inherently physically in-
ferior is without scientific proof. In recent years scientists 
have attached great weight to the fact that their segregation 
in a generally inferior environment greatly increases their 
liability to physicalailments.1I In any event, generalizations 
, Between 1980 and 1939 in California deaths reaulted mOlt frequentq 
from didea&Ies of the circulatory IIYstem, particularly heart diseases. 
TJaese diseases were most prevalent among white persons, not including 
Mexicans, with the exception of· Chinese, who slightly exceeded white 
puraoDil. The eeeond mOlt important caUIe of death was cancer; here, 
white persons ueeeded a)) others without exception. Tuberculosis, an 
important cause of death, occurs with greater frequency among Negroes 
than among white persons. not including MexieaDs; but Mexieans, 
Indiana, Chinese and Malays have materially higher death rates owiDr 
totubereulosis than Negroes and Japanese. Diaea8ell of the nervoua 
system occur with lcsa frequency among Indiana, Japanese, Mexicans, 
aDd MalaYII than among white penons, Negroes, and ChiD08e. (Tho 
Population of California, Commonwealth Club of California Relk!8reh 
Ht'lvien (1946) pp. 217 et seq.) 
Rl'llpondent'a contention that fertiUt7 of Negroes and mulattoes fa 
low is questionable. (See note 8, II1lpra) Dr; S. J. Holmes (1937) The 
Negro's Struggle for Survival, p. 176, states: "The fact is that wo 
h"vc not adequate data on a aufficiently large seale to enable us to 
. decide how the mixed origin of the mulatto affects fertility, if it 
a1foetli it at all." Although Negro fertility rutes are gtlnt'rally Iflwl'r 
than those of white persons, other nOD·whftCll far exer"d white's in 
birth ra.te. Further, tht' fertility rate of Rural·farm Nf'grOl'.8 (:%('f't'ds 
that of Rural·farm whites. Scientists givc varioua int«'.rpretatioDa of 
statistics on fertility, analyzing them in the light of environmental as w.!ll 
as hl.'rl'ditary fadors. (Population of Californi:t, n"ra, pp. 212 ct IINJ.; 
lee I Myrdal, p. 134, ell. '7.) 
." Reo, I Myrdal, pp. 140-)44; S. J. Holm''8,Tht' Negro'a RtrDgglo 
for ~u1"Viyal. p. )30. 
Rrl1pondf'Dt ('onU'Dds, howcv(·r, that tllere ill a: rneial :tilmmt among 
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based on race are unt.rustworthy in view of the gr('at variation:t 
among members of the same race. The rationalization, then'-
fore, that marriag(' between Caucasians and non-Caucasians 
is socially undesirable because of the physical disabilities of 
the latter, fails to take account of the physical disabilities of 
.Caucasians and fails also to take account of variations among 
non-Caucasians. The Legislature is free to prohibit marriages 
that are socially dangerous because of the physical disabilities 
of the parties concerned. (See, Civ. Code §§ 79.01, 79.06.) 
The miscegenation statute, however, condemns certain races 
as unfit to marry with Caucasians on the premise of a hypo-
thetical racial disability, regardless of the physical qualifica-
tions of the individuals concerned. If this premise were carried 
to its logical conclusion, non-Caucasians who are now pre· 
cluded from marrying Caucasians on physical grounds would 
also be precluded from marrying among themselves on the 
same grounds. The concern to prevent marriages in the tirst 
category and the indifference about marriages in the second 
l"('vea] the spuriousness of the contention that intermarriage 
bet ween Caucasians and non-Caucasians is socially dangerous 
on physical grounds. 
Respondent also contends that Negroes, and impliedly the 
other races specified in section 60, are inferior mentally to 
Caucasians. It is true that in the United States catalogues 
of distinguished people list more Caucasians than members 
of other races. It cannot be disregarded, however, that Cau-
casians are in the great majority and have generally had a 
more advantageous environment, and that the capacity of 
the members of any race to contribute to a nation's culture 
depends in large measure on how freely they may pariicinate 
in that culture. There is no scientific proof that one race is 
IUperior to another in native ability.' The data on which 
Kodieinc, Burgol1 and Obetetriea (1946) VoL S, p. 74G, quoWd l,y 
1'eSI'onuent, " Statistical studies indicAte that 7 to 8 per cr.nt ot 
NegrOCl mow the 8ickle-cell trait, though not necaas:uily suffering trom 
Bickle·eelJ anemL,,-" Assuming that the sickle-cell trAit is found ODly iD 
Negrocs, despite known extensive iDtermnture of the ~ .. , rcspondl'nt 
has shown only the trait and not the prevalence ot sicklo·eell ant'mia. 
Civil Code l14~ction 711.01, which requiraa " premarital blood test, make. 
ao provision for a report on sickle-eell anemia. 
-Bee, I ll1rdal, pp. 147·148: "These negative conclusions from man,. 
cleeades of the moat painstakiDg scientific labor stand in glaring contrast 
to the ordiDaJ'7 white AmeriCAn's firm couviction that there Are tunda· 
mental psychic differences between Nl'gr~ and whites. The reRson 
for this contrast is not 80 mueh that thc' ordinal1 white Amrrienn haR 
made an error iD observation, for most 8tudit~s of iDtf>lligl'ncr show that 
the avera,o Nerro in the IAIIlplc, if judg(,d b)' perfol1ll.'Ulee Oil tho 
/ 
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Caucasian superiority is based have undcrgone (!onsiaerable 
rcevalulltiOll by social and physical scientists in the past two 
decades. Although scientists do not discount the influence of 
heredity on the ability to score highly on mental tests, there 
is no certain correlation between race and intelligence. There 
have been outstanding individuals in all races, and there has 
also been wide variation in the individuals of all races. In any 
evcnt the Legislature has not madl' an intelligence test a pre-
requisite to marriage. If respondent's blanket condemnation 
of the mental ability of the proscribed races were accepted, 
there would be no limit to discriminations based upon the 
purported inferiority of certain races. It would then be 
logical to forbid Negroes to marry Negroes, or Mongolians to 
marry Mongolians, on the ground of mental inferiority, or 
by sterilization to decrease their numbers. 
Respondent contends, however, that persons wiShing to 
marry in c:ontravention of race barriers come from the 
"dregs of society" and that their progeny will therefore be 
a burden on the community. There is no law forbidding mar-
riage among the "dregs of society," assuming that this ex-
prl'ssion is capable of definition. If there were such a law, 
it could not be applied without a proper determination of 
the persons that fall within that category, a determination 
that could hardly be made on the basis of race alone. 
Respondent contends that even if the races specified in 
the statute are not by nature inferior to the Caucasian race, 
the statute can be justified as a means of diminishing race 
tension and prevt>nting the birth of children who might become 
social problems . 
. teat, is inferior to the average white person in the aample, and lOme 
studies show that the average Negro has certain specific personalit1 
differences from the white man, but that he haa madl' an error in 
inferring that observed difference. were innate and a part of • nature.' 
He has not been able to discern the influence of gross ·environmental 
differences, much less the influence of more subtle life experiences. The 
fact should not be ignored, however, that he haa also made many 
ohservational errors, because hiB observatioDl have been limited and 
biased." See, also, Ralph Linton, Sterling Professor of Anthropology, 
Yale University, 64 Am.Merc. pp. 133, 139; Joseph Peterson & Lyle H. 
Lanier, Studies in the Comparative Abilities of Wbites and Negroes, 
No.5, Mental Measurement Monographs (1929); Otto Klineberg, A. 
IUudy of Psychological Difft'rI'D('es Betwel'n .. Raeinl" and National 
Groups in Europe, Archives of Psychology, No. 132, vol. XX, (1931); 
Tbomas Russell Garth (193l) Rae.e Psychology, A Stud1 of Racial 
Mental Di:tferences; I !4yrdnl, pp. 144·153; Otto Klineberg, (1935) 
Negro Intelligence and Selective Mijrrationj Ruth Benedict (1943) Race: 
Science and Politics, pp. 98·147. 
I 
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It is true that in somc communities the mnrriage of persnns 
of different rac('s may result in tension. Similarly, race tp,nsion 
may result from the tmforcement of the constitutional require-
ment that persons must not be excluded from juries sole:ly on 
the ground of color, or segrcl!ated by law to certllin district" 
within n city. In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, )11 [3R 
S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149J, the Suprl'me Court of the Uniteo 
StHt()l; declnrpd unconstitutional a Rtntute forhidding n "white 
pCl'Ron" to move illto a block wherl' the p:reater number of 
rc,.;idcncl'S were occupied by "colored persons" nno forbidding 
a "cnlored person" to move into a block where the greater 
number of rpsidences were occupied by "whitp persons." The 
cont,·utiun was made that the "proposed segregation will 
}lrllJfllltto the public peace by preventing race conflicts." The 
CQur[ !;t.nt.f>!l in its opinion that desirable "as this is, and 
import.'lIlt as ill the preservation of the public peace, this aim 
('.a.n11l1t be :lc('omplished by laws or ordinances which deny 
ril-rhtS created or protected by the Federal Constituti{}n." 
(31"·, Cttntwell v. State, 310 U.S. 296. 310 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 
L.l~d. 1~13, 128 A.L.R. 13521.) 
'rlK d'fect of racl' prejudice upon any community is un-
qurlStionably df-trimental both to the minority that is singled 
ont for discrimination and to the dominant group that would 
pl'rpetnatc the prejudice. It is no answer to say that race 
tension can be eradicated through the perpetua.tion by Jaw 
of tht, prejudices that give rise to the tension. Nor can any 
rdinnce be placf'd on the decisions of the United States 
Auprt'me Court upholding laws requiring segregation of races 
in fncilities supplied by local common carriers and schools, 
for that court hns muite it clear that in those· instances the 
stut.· must 8t'cmre equal facilities for all persons regardless 
of race in ordt'r that no substantive rit!ht be impaired. (Sipuel 
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 [68S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 
--], [16 U.S. Law Week 4090] ; Afissouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350-351 [59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208].) 
In the present ense, however, there is no redress for the serious 
restriction of the right of Nt'groes, mulattoes, Mongolians, 
and Ma.lays to lllarry; cl'rtllinly there is none in the cor-
rt'spuuding rf'striction of tlU:' right of Caucasians to marry. 
A m('mber of amy of t.hffiP rae!'!; may find himself barred by 
Inw from marrying til(' pl-rSOIl of his ehoice and that pl'rson 
to him mny bl' irreplncl·able. Hllman beings are bereft of 
worth and dignity by a doctrine that would make them as 
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Uespondent relies on Pace v . .Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 
[1 S.Ct. 637, 27 L.Ed. 207], in whieh the United States 
Supreme Court held constitutional an Alabama statute im-
posiug more severe punishment for adultery or fornication 
between a white person and a Negro than for such nets 
between individuals belonging to the same race. The All\bama 
statute also referred to intermarriage but the court considered 
the case as one dealing solely with adultery and nonmarital 
intercourse. We are not required by the facts of this ca.c;c 
to discuss the reasoning of Pace v. Alabama except to state 
that adultery and nonmarital intercourse are not, like mar-
riage, a b&ijic right, but are offenses subject to various degrees 
of punishment. 
Thc rationalization that race discrimination diminishes the 
contncts and therefore the tensions between races would per-
petuate the deprivation of rights of racial minorities. It would 
justify an abridgment of their privilege of holding office, 
of jury service, of entering the professions. The courts have 
made it clear that these privileges are not the prerogatives 
of anyrace. 
It is contended that interracial marriage has adverse 
effects not only upon the parties thereto but upon their 
prog-eny. Respondent relies on Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 [47 
8.Ct. 584, 71 L.Ed. 1000], for the proposition that the state 
"may properly protect itself as well as the children by taking 
steps which will prevent the birth of offspring who will con-
stitutt' a serious social problem, even though such legislation 
must nt'ccssarily interfere with a natural right." That case, 
however, involved a statute authorizing sterilization of imbe-
ciles following scientific verification and the observance of 
procedural RUarantees. In Bu.ck v. BeU the person sterilized 
was the feeble-minded child of a feeble-minded mother and 
was herself the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child. 
(See, Wclf. & Inst. Code, § 6624.) The inheritability of mental 
defectiveness docs not concern us here, for this case doC's 
not involve mentally defective persons. The Supreme Court 
of the United States later forbade the sterilization of criminals 
in 8kt.ner v. Oklahoma, supra, where the Legislature failed 
to provide a fair hearing and set up illogical and discrimina-
tory eategories. The racial categories ill the miscegenation 
law are 88 illogical and discriminatory as those condemned 
. by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma; and there 
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Respondent mawtains that Negroes arc socially inferior 
and have so been judicially recognized (e.g., Wolfe v. Georgia 
By. 1M Elec. 00.,2 Ga.App. 499 l58 S.E. 899, 901]), and that 
the progeny of a marriage between a Negro and a Caucasian 
suffer not only the stigma of such inferiority but thc fear of 
rejection by membcrs of both races. If they do, th~ fault 
lie!:; not with their partlnts, but with the prejudices in the 
community and the laws that perpetuate those prejudices 
by giving legal force to the belief that llertain races are iu-
ferior. If miscl·gcnous marriages can be prohibited because 
of tt.·nsions su1fered by the progeny, mixed religious unions 
could be prohibited on the same ground.7 
Th('re arc now so many persons in the United Statt's of 
mlxl'd ancestry, that the tensions upon them are alroody di-
minishing and are bound to diminish even more in time.' 
Already many of the progeny of mixed marriagcs have made 
important contributions to the community. In nny event 
the contention that the misceganation laws prohibit interracial 
marriag(' becaus(' of its adverse dects on the progeny is 
belied by the extreme racial intermixture that it tolerates. 
For many years progress was slow in the dissipation of 
tht' insecurity that haunts racial minorities, for there are 
many who believe that their own security depends on its 
maintenance. Out of earnest belief, or out of irrational fears, 
thcy reason in a circle that such minorities are inferior in 
health, intelligeDce, and culture, and that this inferiority 
proves the need of the barriers of race prejudice. 
Careful examination of the ar.guments in support of the 
legislation in question reveals that "there is absent the 
compelling justmcation which would be needed to sustain 
discrimination of that nature." (Oyama v. Oalifornia, 332 
U.S. 633 [68 S.Ct. 269, 272, 92 L.Ed. -].) Certainly 
the fact alone that the discrimination has been sanctioned 
by thl' state for many years does not supply such justification. 
(Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.l [68 s.Ot. 836, 92 L.Ed. --] ; 
Oyama v. Oalifornia, supra; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Oom., 
334 U.S. 410 [68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. --] ; see Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (6S S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. -].) 
T Indeed,: Father John La }'arge S. J. (1943) The Racc Qucstion and 
The Nt'gro (Permissu Superiorum), p. 196, eonsiders the tensions "not 
unlike.' , 
8 See, M. J. Herskovits (1930) The Anthropometry of the American 
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[Sa] Even if a state could restrict the right to marry 
upon the basis of race alone, sections 60 and 69 of the Civil 
Code are nevel·theJess invalid because they are too vague and 
uncertain to constitute a valid regulation. A certain precision 
is essential in a statute regulating a fundamental right. "It 
is thl! duty of the lawmaking body in framing laws to express 
its intent in clear and plain language to the end that the people 
upon whom it is designed to opcrntl! way be able to understand 
the It"·gislative "ill." (In re Alpine, 2Ua Cal. 731, 736-737 
[265 P. U47, 56 A.L.1:t. 1500] ; ca.'wl'I collected 50 Am.Jur. 484.) 
HIt is a fundaml'ntnl rule that no eitizp..ll I:Ihould be deprived of 
his liberty for the vi(,lat.ion of a law which is uncertain and 
ambiguous." (In rc Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 344, 348 [149 P.2d 
689] ; In re Peppers, 1$9 Cal. 682, 686 [209 P. 896] ; United 
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-92 [41 8.Ct. 2!18, 
65 L.Ed. 516J; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 
[59 8.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888] ; Connally v. General Construc-
tion Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 [46 8.Ot. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322].) 
[9] The requirement that a law be definite and its mean-
ing ascertainable by those whose rights and duties are governed 
thereby applies not only to penal statutes, but to laws gov-
erning fundamental rights and liberties. (Standard C. ·ct M. 
Corp. v. Waugh C. Corp., 231 N. Y. 51, 54 [131 N.E. 566, 14 
A.L.R. 1054]; Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 
U.S. 233, 239 [45 s.Ot. 295, 69 L.Ed. 589]; see also State 
ex rel. Dickason v. Harris, 158 La. 974, 978 [105 So. 33].) 
'l'hus, this court in Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
14~ Cal. 590,595 [84 P. 39, 113 Am.St.Rep. 315, 7 Ann.Cas. 
750, 3 L.R.A.N.S. 896] declared invalid a statute regulating 
the practice of medicine on the ground that its provisions were 
too vague and uncertain to govern one's right to practice a 
profession. In In re Di Torio, 8 F.2d 279, 281 it was held 
that a provision of a statute regUlating naturalization of 
aliens was invalid on the same ground. Although the pro-
vision in question seemed clear on its face, the court refused 
to apply the statute to vacate an order of admission to 
citizcnship because II An act is void where its language appears 
on its face to have a meaning, but it is impossible to give 
it any precise or intelligible application in the circumstances 
under which it was intenued to operate." (1n re Di Tono, 
supra at 281 and cases there cited.) 
[8b] Section 60 of the Ch·jl COOt' n"r.1arf's void all msl'-
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of the Malay race or mulattoes. In this section, the Legisla-
ture has adopted one of the many systems classifiying persons 
on the basis of race. Racial classifications that have been 
made in the past vary as to the number of divisions and the 
features regarded as distinguishing the members of each 
division. The number of races distinguished by systems of 
classification "varies from three or four to thirty-four." 
(Boa!',. 7 Encyclopedia of So<:. Sciences. 25, 26.) The Legisla-
ture's classification in section 60 is based on the system sug-
gested by Blumenbach early in the nineteenth century. (Rol-
dan v. L08 Angeles County, 129 Cal.App. 267, 273 [18 P.2d 
706] .) Blumenbach classified man into five races: Caucasian 
(white), Mongolian (yellow), Ethiopian (black), American 
Indian (red), and Malayan (brown). Even if that hard and 
fast classification be applied to persons all of whose ancestors 
belonged to one of these racial divisions," the IJegislature has 
made no provision for applying the statute to persons of mixed 
ancestry. The fact is overwhelming that there has been a 
steady increase in the number of people in this country who 
belong to more than one race, and a growing number who have 
succeeded in identifying themselves with the Caucasian race 
even though they are not exclusively Caucasian. Some of these 
persons have migrated to this state; some are born here illegit-
imately; others are the progeny of miscegenous marriages 
valid where contracted and thereforc valid in California. 
(Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 125.) The apparent purpose 
of the statute is to discourage the birth of children of mixed an-
cestry within this state. Such a purpose, however, cannot be 
accomplished without taking into consideration marriages 
of persons of mixed ancestry. A statute regulating funda-
mental rights is clearly unconstitutional if it cannot be reason-
ably applied to accomplish its purpose. This court therefore 
cannot determine the constitutionality of the statute in ques-
tion on the assumption that its provisions might, WIth suffi-
cient definiteness, be applied to persons not of mixed ancestry. 
The only reference made in the statute to persons of mixed 
ancestry is the prohibition of marriages between a "white per-
son" and a "mulatto." Even the term "mulatto" is not 
defined. The lack of a definition of that term leads to a 
special problem of how the statute is to he applied to a 
.. See Julian S. Buxley and B. C. Haddon (1936) We Europeans, 
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person, some but not all of whose ancestors are Negroes." The 
only case in this state attempting to define the term "mulatto" 
in section 60 of the Civil Code leaves undecided whether a 
person with less than one-eighth Negro blood isa "mulatto" 
within the meaning of the statute. (Estate of Stark, 48 Cal. 
App.2d209, 214 [119 P.2d 961].) Even more uncertainty 
surrounds the meaning of the terms "white persons," "Mon-
golians," and "members of the Malay race." 
If the statute is to be applied generally to persons of mixed 
ancestry the question arises whether it is to be applied on the 
basis of the physical appearance of the individual or on the 
basis of a genealogical research as to his ancestry. If the 
physical appearance of the individual is to be the test, the 
statute would have to be applied on the basis of subjective 
impressions of various persons Persons having the same 
parents and consequently the same hereditarybaekground 
eould be classified differently. On the other hand, if the 
application of the statute to persons of mixed ancestry is to 
be based on genealogical research, the question immediately 
arises what proportions of Caucasian, Mongolian, or Malayan 
ancestors govern the applicability of thE.' statute. Is it any 
trace of Mongolian or :Malayan- ancestry, or is it Bome un-
Ipecified proportion of such ancestry that makes . a person 
a Mongolian or )lalayan within the meaning of section 60' 
To determine that a person is a Mon~o1ian or Malayan 
within the meaning of the statute because of any trace of 
II Black'i Law Dictionary (3d eel.) defines a nlulatto as "A penon 
that is the olfspring of a negress b1 a white man, or of a white woman 
b1 a negro ..•• In a more general sense, a penon of mixed Caucasian 
&lid negro blood, or Indian and Negro blood ...• Properly a mulatto 
ia a person one of whose parents is wholly black and the other wholly 
white; but the word does not alwaYI, though perhaps it docs generally, 
require 10 exactly e\'en a mixture of blood, nor is ita signification 
alike iD all the ltates ••.• " The lame lOurce defines a Negro aa 
followl: "The word 'negro' means a black man, one descended from 
the African race, &lid does not commonly include a mulatto .••. But 
tbe laws of the dilferent ltates are not uniform in tbis respect, 80me 
including iD the description 'negro' one wbo has one-eiglJtll or more of 
African blood. Term 'negro' means necessarily penon of color, but not 
every person of color is a 'negro'." The foregoing definitions of 
"Mulatto" and "Negro" are substantially tIle ome RR the definitioDs 
contained in Bouvier'. Law Dictionary. 
See alao I Myrdal, An Americon Dilemma, p. 113: •• Legislation iD 
thil respect tends to conform to sooial usage, althongh oftt'n it II not 
10 exclusive. In lOme ltates one Negro grnudpnrent defines a penOD 
aa a Negro for legal purposes, ill otber states any Negro am'el'tor-DO 
tn:1tter how fllr removed--is sufficient_ In the SOllthern state~ itt'fillition. 
of 11'110 II a Negro are oft.t>n eonftil'tinJ:. Rine~ re~onstrl1etion. tber!! hal 
been a Uondenl'Y to brollcl.'n thl' dl'fillition. The Northl'astem ltate! 
,enerally have no definition. of Negro in law." 
/ 
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. such ancestry, however slight, would be absurd. II the classi· 
fication of a person of mixed ancestry depends upon a given 
proportion of Mongolians or Malayans among his ancestor!!, 
how can this court, without clearly invading the province of 
the Legislature, determine what that decisive proportion is' 
(Spe, Pacific Coast etc. Bank v. Roberts, 16 Cal.2o SOO, 805 
[l08 P.2d 439).) Nor can this court assume that a predomi. 
nance in number of ancestors of one race makes a person a 
Cnucru;ian, Mongolian, or Malayan within the meaning of the 
statute, for absurd results would follow from such an assump-
tion. Thus, a person with thrct'-sixtcenths Malay ancestry 
might have many so-called Malay characteristics and yet be 
('ollsio,reo Ii white person in terms of his preponderantly 
white ancestry. Such n person might easily find himself in a 
dill'mma, for if he Were r(}garded as n white person under 
section GO, he would be forbidden to marry a Maln.y, :md yet 
his Malay characteristics might effectively pr<:clnde his mar· 
ring,· to :mother white p(}rson. Similarly, a person having 
thrl'c-l'ightbs Mon!~olian ancestry might legally be classed as 
a whitl' person even thour.h he possessed Mongolian character-
istic!!. He might have little opportunity or inclination to 
marry anyone other than a Mongolian, yet section 60 might 
forbid such a marriage. Moreover, if a person were of four-
eighths Mongolian or Malayan ancestry and four-eighths white 
anc"stry, a test based on predominance in number of ancestors 
could not be applied. 
Section 69 of the Civil Code and section 60 on which it is 
based are therefore too vague and uncertain to be npheld 
as a valid regulation of the right to marry. Enforcement of 
th(' statute would place upon t.he officials charged with its 
administration and upon the courts charged with reviewing 
the legality of such administration the task of determining 
the meaning of the statute. That task could be carried out 
with rf'Spect to persons of mixed ancestry only on the basis of 
conceptioD.'l of race classification not supplied by the Legis-
lature. "If no judical certainty can be settled upon as to the 
meaning of a statute, the courts are not at liberty to supply 
one." (In re Di Torio,S F.2d 279, 281.) 
In summary, we hold that sections 60 and 69 are not only 
too vague and ~certain to be enforceable regulations of a 
fundamental right, but that they violate the equal protection 
of the laws clause of the United States Constitution by impair-
ing the right of individuals to marry on the basis of race 
/ 
) 
732 PEREZ t1. SHARP [32 C.2d 
Illou!) anll by arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating 
against certain racial groups. 
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
CAUTER, J., concurring.-It is my considcred OpInIOn 
t]lat the statutes here involved (Civ. Code, §§ 60, 6H) arc thl! 
product of ignorance, prejudice and intolerancc, and 1 am 
happy to join in the decision of this court holding that they 
are invalid and unenforceable. This decision is in harmony 
with the declarations contained in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence which are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and reaffirmed by the Charter of the United Nations, 
that all human beings have equal rights regardless of rutc, 
color or creed, and that the right to liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness is inalienable and may not be infringed becausc 
of race, color or creed. To say that these statutes may stand 
in the face of the concept of liberty and equality embraced 
within the ambit of the above-mentioned fundamental law 
is to make of that concept an empty, hollow mockery. 
The Declaration of Independence declares: "We hold 
these truths to be self evident: That all men are created 
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these art' life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; . . ." 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States provides: "Section 1. All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." 
The Charter of the Unit<>d Nations contains the following 
declaration: "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
DETERMINED: . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
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equal rights of men and women and of nations larR'e aud 
small . . . to promote social progress and better stllndar,ls 
of life in larger freedom. . . . And for these endM . . . to 
practice tolerance ... " (Preamble.) " ... in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for funtla-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to rl\I!(', 8l':X, 
language, or religion . . ." (Ch. I, art. I, § 3.) 
In the face of these nutboritative pruuounCI'Dlt!Ut'l the 
matter of race equality should be A I':t!ttll.'d mue. It is, at 
least, a settled issue 80 fur as the fuudmll':utal law is clln-
cerned. And the only qul'Stiun before us is whether the 
Legislature may enaet a vru.id statute in direct conflict with 
this fundamental law. It seems clear to me that it is not 
possible for the Leghdature, in the face of our fundamental 
law, to enact a valid statute which proscribes conduct on a 
purely racial basis. Such are the statutes here involved. 
The wisdom of the broad, liberal concept of liberty and 
equality declared in our fundamental law should be apparent 
to every unprejudiced mind. 
The Apostle Paul declared that: "God ... hath made of 
one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of 
the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, 
and the bounds of their habitation." (The Acts of the 
Apostles, ch.17, v. 26.) 
Cedric Dover writes in his book "Half-Caste": "Perhaps 
our Neanderthal ancestors arose from mixture between ape-
men of the Ice Age. Perhaps our Neolithic prototypes 
emerged from relations between the Aurignacian invaders 
of Europe and the local Neanderthals. We shall be content 
with the knowledge that miscegenation has influenced human 
evolution from the earliest times, that there has not been a 
pure race of our species for at lea'lt ten thousand years." 
In a letter to Cbastellux in 1785 Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
., I have supposed the black man, in his present state, might 
not be in body and mind equal to the white man; but it would 
b(' hazardous to affirm that, equally cultivated for a few 
generations, he would not become so." Notwithstanding this 
statement, Jefferson, who was the author of the Declaration 
of Independence, made it clear that the Negro is entitled to 
~njoy equal1y with others the "unalienable rights of life, 
liberty an" the pursuit of happiness. ,. 
'flip D<'(')aration of Indppendence is a part of the law of 
our land. It is to be found as part of the Statutes at Large 
) 
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on page 1 of volume 1. It has been given effect as a legis-
lative enactment (Inglis v. Trustees of the Senlor's Snug 
Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 L7 L.Ed. 617], and othcr cas(>s 
cited in U.S.C.A., 1 Constitution, pp. 7, 8; Fidelity &- Casualty 
Co. of New York v. Union Savings Bank Co., 29 Ohio App. 
154 (163 N.E. 221]). It declares that; "All men are created 
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; . . ." No one will question that, so far 
as pl)titioners are concerned, this case involves the pursuit 
of happiness in its clearest and most universally approved 
forUl. 
It is a matter of law as well as hic;torical knowledge that 
after the Revolution all men were not, in law, equal (Dred 
Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 [15 L.Rd. 6~1]). But 
it is well to remember that men fought, bled, and died for 
the truth of the proposition. 
In the Dred Scott case, supra, the truth of the proposition 
was questioned and denied in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Taney. It is again a matter of historical knowledge that this 
decision helped to kindle the fire which brought on the Ch'U 
War. In this war men fought, bled and died for their belief 
in the essential equality of man. 
Abraham Lincoln, in his never-to-be-forgotten Gettysburg 
Address, told us, because he was speaking to the future as 
well as of the past, that" Four score and seven years ago our 
fathers brought forth upon this continent, a new nation, 
conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that 
all men are created equal." He asked whether "[A J ny 
nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure." 
The Civil War was supposed to definitely and conclusively 
answer that question. This being so, should a state, or even 
a number of states, legislate to destroy that ideal when great 
wars have been fought to preserve it f An ideal for which 
men gave their lives and the lives of their families should be 
a precious heritage to be carefully guarded. And yet all men 
are not now being given equal treatment! 
The freedom to marry the person of one's choice has not 
always existed, and evidently does not exist here today. But 
is not that one of the fundamental rights of a free people 1 
Blackstone said that; "Liberty consists in being limit.ed only 
by that Supreme Law which is the expression of abstract 
right. " If the right to marrJ' is a fundamental right, then 
it must be conceded that an infringement of that right b~' 
I 
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means of a racial re::;trictioll is an unlawful infringement 
of one's liberty. It is immaterial that perhaps only a few 
would wish to marry persons not of their own race or color. 
It is material that the few who do so desire have the right 
to make that choice. It is only ignorance, prejudice and 
intolerance which denies it. Since this state will recognize 
as valid a marriage performed in another state between mem-
bers of these two races it follows that the marriage cannot be 
considered vitally detrimental to the public health, welfare 
and morals. . 
The Constitution of the State of California, article 1, sec-
tion 13, provides that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law. Due process 
of law consists not only of the individual's right to procedural 
due process, but his right to substantive due process-that 
thtl state, through legislation, shall not deprive him of one 
of his" liberties. " 
Our Constit.ution, like the Constitution of the United States, 
is n restriction upon the powers of the state. Upon this 
court devolves the duty of guarding that Constitution and the 
rights it protects, as upon the Supreme Court of the United 
States devolves the duty of guarding th~ Constitution of the 
United States. 
The student of constitutional law knows that the Civil War 
amendments to the Constitution did not accomplish their 
intended purpose, which was to create a real, over-all equality 
such as the Declaration of Independence contemplated, and 
which such cases as the Dred Scott case prevented from being 
realized. (Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court, 30 Minn. 
L.Rev.219.) 
In the years following the adoption of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, many court.s still did 
not think that there was real equality among men despite 
the fact that the language of the amendments is quite clear. 
Another round of the vicious circle was begun, this time by 
limiting as far as possible the language of the amendments. 
Many cases might be cited to support this view, but the 
hardest blow to liberal minded persons-the biggest step 
backwards into {lays of slavery-was t.he decision in Plessy v. 
Ferguson" 163 U.S. 537 [16 S.Ot. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256]. That 
case invOlved a Louisiana statute which provided that rail-
roads must provide "equal but separate" accommodations 
for white and colored passengers, and that, under penalty, 
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no member of either group should be permitted to use the 
accoDlmodations provided for the other. The Supreme Court 
upheld the statute, and laid down the rule that the state had 
power to make regulations of this kind" in good faith for the 
promotion of the public good." The court also said that the 
question came down to the "reasonableness of the regula-
tion!' (Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, p. 537.) By using that 
language, however, the Supreme Court left the door open for 
a future, more enlightened generation. For, if the reason-
ableness of the regulation is the only test, it may and will 
happen that a regulation was reasonable from the point of 
view of the Legislature enacting it and the court first passing 
on it. And yet, in the light of future developments, all 
the reasonableness may have been lost and the regulation 
may have reduced itself to a mere tool of oppression-a hang-
over from quaint and superstitious days of yore. There are 
pnough statutes of this kind to fiB periodically a column in 
Collier's magazine. Most statutes thus rendered obsolete are 
not especially vicious, and most of t.hem are not enforced. 
I t is safe to assume that most of them would be struck down 
today if their constitutionality were challenged, because what 
once may have appeared reasonable has become an absurdity. 
It is, of course, conceded that the state in the exercise of 
the police power may legislate for the protection of the health 
and welfare of the people and in so doing may infringe to 
some extent on the rights of individuals. But it is not 
conceded that a state may legislate to the detriment of a 
class-a minority who are unable to protect themselves, when 
such legislation has no valid purpose behind it. Nor may 
the police power be used as a guise to cloak prejudice and 
intolerance. Prejudice and int.olerance are the cancers of 
civilization. 
It is my position that the statutes now before us never 
were constitutional. When first enacted, they violated the 
supreme law of the land as found in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. It is further my position that the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States invali-
dated the statutes here involved. In 8 powerful dissent in 
Plessy v_ Ferguson, .upra, Justice Harlan said, at page 559: 
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
t.olerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, 
all citizens 8re equal before the law .... The law regards 
l'}18'J 8S man, and takes no account of his surroundings or ()f 
his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme 
) 
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law of the land are involved . . . the judgment this tIay 
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the 
decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." This 
language needs no elaboration. The time at which this judg-
ment has become pernicious has arrived. 
Even if I concede, which I do not, that the statutes here 
involved were at any time reasonable, they are no longer 
reasonable and therefore no longer valid today. The rule is 
that the constitutionality of a statute is not determined once 
and for all by a decision upholding it. A change in con-
ditions may invalidate a statute which was reasonable and 
valid when enacted (Nasktt~7.ze, C. cf St. L. Eg. Co. v. Walters, 
294 U.S. 405 [55 8.Ct. 486, 79 L.Ed. 949], 16 C.J.S. 150). 
In this case, there are no decisions of either this court or 
the Supreme Court of the United States which uphold the 
validity of a statute forbidding or invalidating' miscegenous 
marriages. As has been pointed out, even if there wert: prece-
dent, it would not necessarily be binding in this case. The 
eases from other jurisdictions are, of course, not binding 
here. Under the test laid down by the United States Supreme 
Court in Pless1/ v. Ferguson, supra, the reasonableness of the 
regulation is therefore the decifdvc factor. And there are 
decisions rendered in this state which definitely point the 
way as to wh"t is to be con.c:;idercd "reasonable." and in accord 
with the public policy of this stat.'. 
Thhi court hllK upheld thl' valirlity of miscegenous mar-
riages, so-calII'd, when the marriage was entered into in a 
jurisdiC'tion wh(\rtl no prohihitir)ll existed (Pearson v. Pear-
,on, 51 Cal. 120, 125). Under the well-settled rules of the 
law of Conflict of Ln.ws, this court could have denied validity 
to such marriages, provided they were "odious" to its own 
internal policy. It did not do so, and it has indicated in 
oth\lr holdings in which the problem of miscegenation was 
collaterally involved that it does not consider the internal 
policy of this state one which would lead it to refuse validity 
to such marriages (Rest. of Contlicts of Laws, § 132 (c». 
Some of the statutes of the type here under attack have 
been upheld as reasonably designed to prevent race rioting. 
The fact that this court grants recognition to foreign misee-
genous marriages, valid where contracted, is enough to rebut 
that arguinent. Riots would either follow in both cases or in 
none. One author sums up the problem by asking: "Does 
this not mean that the miscegellation statute applies only to 
U C.Jd-24 
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those who citht'r have an inadt'qllate knowledge of the law 
and/or cannot afford the t.rain fare t.o a state where the 
attempted marriage w0111u b~ valid!" (Tragen, 32 Cal.L. 
Rev. 269, 277.) 
So far as the policy of this court is concerned, there is no 
basis for upholding the statutes. But it is said that it is not 
the policy of the court but that. of the Legislature whieh 
should control. And there again, there are strong indica-
tions of legislative trends and intentions which point the way. 
So far as employment under public contracts is concerned, 
the laws of this state forbid discrimination based on color 
(Lab. Code, § 1735). So far as civil rights other than the 
right to marry are concerned, they are guaranteed by Civil 
Code, section 52. The statutes forbidding miscegenous mar-
riages here under attack are further distinguished from 
statutes in other jurisdictions in that they are entirely 
dtlclaratory, while all the others carry with them penalties 
for violation. This, too, would indicate an attitude of com-
parative indifference on part of the Legislature, and the 
Itbsence of any clearly expressed public sentiment or policy. 
The legislation here under attack is also sought to be 
sustained on the ground tbat a legislative enactment duly 
made and based on "some evidence" is presumptively valid. 
The general rule to that effect may be conceded. But it dors 
Dot apply to a case of this kind. In cases involving disc rim-
mation, thr rule is that laid down by the Suprrmc C011rt of 
the United States in Knrematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 216 [65 s.et. ID3, 194, 89 L.Ed. 194, 19!1], whcr~ the 
court spcaking through Mr. Justice nlack saiu: " ... all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect ... courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity 
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions: 
racial antagonism never can." That suspicion which attaches 
to cases involving discrimination is sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of validity and constitutionality normally pres-
ent when a statute is attacked as uncom;titutional. 
Finally, the statute is sOllght. to be upheld for "socio-
logical" reasons. The evidence prt'sent«.>d to sustain the 
statute and that tending to show it up as unreasonable falls 
into two groups. One is concerned with the social effect of 
such marriages on the parties and those close to them. That 
So.>eial ostrllcism may well result. to the parties and perhaps 
their offspring, may be concedrd. But that is something 
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which the state is powerless to control and which it cannot 
prevent by legislation. It therefore furnishes no basis for 
legislation, either. It is something resting with the parties 
themselves, for them to decide. If they choose to face this 
possible prejudice and think that their own pursuit of happi-
ness is better subserved by entering into this marriage with 
all its risks than by spending the rest of their lives without 
each other's company and comfort, the state should not and 
cannot stop them. 
The other aspect of the evidence adduced is the medieo-
eugenic one. A great deal has been written and said about 
the desirability or undesirability of racial mixtures. The 
writers seem to be in such hopeless conflict that their lack 
of bias may well be questioned. Suffice it to quote th~ follow-
ing from petitioner's brief: 
"The blood-mixing however, with the lowering of the racial 
level caused by it, is the sole cause of the dying-off of old 
cultures; for the people do not pcrish by lost wars, but by 
thf' loss of that force of resistance which is contained only 
itl tht' pure blood. 
"All that is not race in this world is trash. " 
"The result of any cros."in/!, in bricf, is always t.he fol-
lo..-ing: (a) lowerin~ of the "tandard of th~ hi~her rae(', 
(bj plJysical and mental regression, and, with it, the begin-
nin!! of sl()\vly but steadily progrcssiyc lin;tcring illness." 
"J:\'ery raec-e.l'ossing leads necessarily Rooner or later to 
the tIt-cline of th(;' mixed product. The danger for the mixed 
product is aboliRhed only in the moment of the bastardizll-
tion of the last higher, racially pure element. " 
" ... [T]here is only one most sacred human right, and 
this right iF: at the same time the most sacred obligation, 
namely, to Flee to it that the blood is preserv(;'d pure, so that 
by its preservation of the best human material a possibility 
is given for a more noble development of these human beings." 
This quotation is from Hitler's "Mein Kampf" as pub-
lished in translation in New York in 1940. To bring into 
issue the correctness of the writings of a madman, a rabble-
rouser, a mass-murderer, would be to clothe his utteranees 
with an undeserved aura of respectability and authoritative-
ness. Let U!'l not for~et that this was the man who plunged 
the worl<l111to a war in which, for the third time. Am(;'ri('alls 
fought, hIed. and died for the truth of the proposition tllat 
all lllen are created equal. 
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We may take judicial notice of the £act-flince it is • 
politiral and historical fact--that steady inroads have been 
made on the myth of racial superiority and its outgrowths. 
'I'he rest of the world never has understood and never 
will understand why and how a nation, built on the premise 
thnt all men are created equal, can three times send the flower 
of its manhood to war for the truth of this premise and still 
fail to carry it out within its own borders. 
In 1682, Lord Nottingham said in the course of an opinion: 
"Pray let us 80 resolve Cases here, that they may stand with 
the Reason of Mankind when thry are debated abroad. Shall 
that be Reason here that is not Reason in any part of the 
World besides!" (Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch.Cas. 1, 33, 
22 Eng.Repr. 931, 935.) 
In my opinion, the statutes here involved violate the very 
premise on which this country and its Constitution were 
built, the very ideas embodied in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the very issue over which the Revolutionary War, 
the Civil War, and the Second World War were fought, and 
to(' spirit in which the Constitution must be interpreted ill 
ort1C'1' that the interpretations will appear as "Reason in 
all." part ofthe World besides." 
EDMONDS, J.-I agree with the conclusion that marriagp, 
is . 'something more than a civil contract subject to regulation 
by the state; it is a fundamental right of free men." Morf'-
over, it is grounded in the fundamental principles of Chris-
tianity. The right to marry, therefore, is protected by the 
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, and I place my 
concurrence in the judgment upon a broader ground than 
that the challenged statutes are discriminatory and irrational. 
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 
L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (1940), the United States 
Supreme Court, for the first time expressly held that, through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state 
st.atute may be declared invalid if it violates the specific guar-
Ilntee of religious freedom as stated in the First Amendment. 
The consequences of that decision were forcefully stated by 
:\Ir. Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
fion v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 
1628,147 AL.R. 674], as follows: "In weighing argumpnts 
of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument 
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those (~a.<lt!S in which it is applied for it~ own sake. The test 
of kgimation which collides with thtl Pourtcllnth Amendment, 
bl'C:1USC it nlso collides with the principles of the First, is 
lUllCh more definite than the test whtln only th" Fourteenth is 
involwd. .Much of the vagueness of the due process clause 
disappears when the specific prohibitiollS of the First become 
it.,; "tandard. The riJl'ht of " State to regulate, for example, 
a public utility mlly well include, so far as the due process 
test is concerned, power to iruposc all of the restrictions which 
a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But 
fr<-edom of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship 
ruay not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are sus-
ceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate 
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." 
Reasonable classification, therefore, is not the test to be 
applied to a statute which interferes with one of the funda· 
mental liberties which are protected by the First Amendment. 
The question is whether there is any "clear and present 
dang-er" justifying such legislation (Craig v. Harney, 331 
U.S. 367,372 [67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546J ; Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 333 [66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295]; 
CantweU v. Connecticut, supra, at p. 311; Herndon v. Lowry, 
301 U.S. 242, 256 [57 8.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066] ; Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 8.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470]), 
and the burden of upholding the enactment is upon him who 
asserts that the acts which are denounced do not infringe the 
freedom of the individual. (Busey v. District of Columbia, 138 
F .2d 5!l2, 595.) 
In the present case, the respondent does not claim that 
there is any clear and present danger justifying the restric· 
tions imposed by sections 60 and 69 of the Civil Code. In 18 
stntes, including NeW' York, Illinois and Pennsylvania, where 
about 10 per cent of the Negroes of thll United States reside, 
there are no such linlitntions. The population of California, 
to n large extent, is made up of people who have come to it 
from other sections of the country, and if there are undesir. 
able consequences of interracial marriages, the challenged 
lel"isllltion iR an ineffective means of meeting the problem. 
Thl' decisio~s upholding state statutes prohibiting polygamy 
come within an entirely different category. In Reynolds T. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 [25 L.Ed. 244], marriage was said 
to be, "from its very nature a sacred obligation," but the 
conviction was sustained upon the ground that polygamy 
I 
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violates "the principles upon whic11 the government of tllf 
peoplc, to a greater or less extent, rests." Latcr, tlll' court 
characterized the practice of polygamy as beinA' "contrary 
to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which 
ChriRtianity has produced in theW estern world" (Church 
of Jesus Christ of L. D. S. v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 [10 
S.Ct. 792, 34 L.Ed. 478] ; see Davis v. Beason, 13:3 U.S. 3:3:l 
[10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637)). In effect, therefore, these Cl'.8lS 
rest upon the principle that the conduct which th .. lel?i~lntiulI 
was designed to prevent constituted a clear and pr"!',f'nt 
danger to the well being of the nation and,. for that reasoll, 
the statute did not violate constitutional guarantees. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. 
The power of 1\ state to regulate and control the basic social 
relationship of marriu!!c of its domiciliaries is her(~ challent~cd 
ana set at nought by :\ majority order of thi:; court arrivcd 
at nnt by a concurrt\ncc of reason~ but by tht encl result. of 
four vot~s support,.,l by diVt'r:!l'nt. concept" not supported by 
authority and in fact contrary t(l th,' decisions in this l;13to 
and ~lscwhtlre. 
It will bp. shown that su~h law .. havt' bl'ln in cffed in thi~.; 
country siner bdorc nur national independenlw anfl in tIlil'l 
stat(' Rince our DrRt legi"lluti-.. c· sCs'·;ion. They hay. neVl'r b.'CJ\ 
declared unconRtitution:ll by any court in tht· lunll alth"I1I:11 
freqnently they hnve hcen under att;,(\k. It is difficult to M<:c~ 
why such laws, vulid whml eDlwt.ed ann constitutionally 
enforceahle in this state for nearly 100 years and elf;e-
whert! for n much lonlZ'er period of time, are now unconsti-
tutionnl under the same Const.itution and with no change in 
the factual situation. It will also be shown that they have 
a valid leJrlsllltive purpose even though they may not conform 
to the sociop:enctic views of some people. When that legis-
lative purpose appears it ill entirely beyond judicial power, 
properly exercised, to nullif~' them, 
This proceeding, therefore, jJl\'olves a most important state 
function long Rince recognized as such. Indf'('d as late as 
June 7, 1948, it has bern recognized by the Supreme Court 
of the United States "that thl' regulation of the incidents 
of the marital relation involves the exercise by the states of 
powers of HIe most vital importance." (.~herrer v. Sherrer, 
334 U.S. 34H [68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Etl. --].) Bl'ransl' of 
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with this basic social relationship thc Bubject is worthy of 
somewhat extended discussion in support of our statutes. 
According to the verified petition for the writ of man-
damus to compel the issuance of a marriage license, Andrea 
D. Perez is a white person and Sylvester ,S. Davis, Jr., is a 
Negro. Respondent county clerk rests his refusal to issue a 
certificate and license to them on the ground that he is ex-
pressly prohibited from so doing by the provisions of section 
69 of the Civil Code, and upon the further ground that their 
purported marriage in this state would be illegal and void. 
(Civ. Code, § 60.) 
Section 69 of the Civil Code contains the following proviso: 
". . . no license may be issued authorizing the marriage of 
a white person with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member 
of the Malay race." And complementary section 60 of the 
same code reads: "All marriages of white persons with 
negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes 
are illegal and void." 
Petitioners first contend that the above quoted statutory 
provisions deprive them of the religious freedom guaranteed 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal 
Constitution and article I, section 4, of the Constitution of 
thiR state. Thcy allege that they are members and communi-
cants of the Roman Catholic Church; that it is the dogma, 
belief and teaching of the church that a person of thl' white 
race and a person of the Negro race, if otherwise eligible, 
are entitled to receive conjointly the sacrament of matrimony 
and to intermarry; that the refusal of respondent to issue 
the license denies to them the right to participate fully in 
the sacramental life of the religion in which they believe, 
prohibits the free exercise by them of their religion, and vio-
lates the guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of their 
religious profession and worship. It is further alleged that 
section 69 of the Civil Code is arbitrary, capricious and with-
out reasonable relation to any purpose within the competency 
of the state to effect. 
Respondent on the other hand contends that the classifica-
tions contained in sections 60 and 69 of the Civil Code do not 
transgress the petitioners' freedom of religious worship; that 
such classifications are reasonably designed to promote the 
general welfare and the inter{'sts of individual members of the 
races mentionpo. ano thl'lt thp rt'gnlation is therefore a proper 
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At the outset it may be noted that the petitioners' alleged 
right to marry is not a part of their religion in the broad 
sense that it is a duty enjoined by the church, or that penalty 
and punishment may in some manut'r ensue (cf. B"ynolds v. 
United 8tates, 98 U.S. 145, 161 [25 L.Ed. 244]) ; but rather 
that their marriage is permissive under the dogma, beliefs and 
teaching of the church to which they claim membership and 
thnt the sacrament of matrimony will be administered to them 
by a priest of the church if· and when a license issues. In 
thili connection Father John La Farge, executive editor of 
"America," the national Catholic weekly, in a book entitled 
"The Race Question and The Negro" (Permissu Superi-
orum), (1943), states at page 196: "The Catholic Church 
doClol not impose any impediment, diriment impediment, upon 
racial intermarriage, in spite of the Church's great care to 
preserve in ita utmost purity the integrity of the marriage 
bond. 
"On the other hand, where such intermarriages are pro-
hibited by law, as they are in several states of the Union, 
the Church bids her ministers to respect these laws, and to 
do all that is in their power to dissuade persons from entering 
into such unions." 
The foregoing is mentioned to show that the attitude· of the 
church. has no particular bearing on the asserted righta of 
the petitioners. Its attitude is one of respect for local laws 
and an admonition to its clergy to advise. against their in-
fringement. 
Other considerations are presented in connection with pe-
titioners' contentions that their religious liberty is being in-
fringed. The First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution declares that Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise 
thereof. The due process of law clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment embraces this fundamental concept of liberty as 
expressed in the First Amendment and renders the states 
likewise incompetent to transgress it. However, this religious 
liberty "embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is· absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be." (Oantwell v. Oonnecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 303 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 JJ.Erl. 1213. 128 A.YJ.R. 
1352]; Mu,.dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 l63 S.Ct. 
870,891,87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.n.. 81] ; Gospel A,.my v. City 
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been held that couuuct, cmnl>jl>t.iug of }>l'lldicel; and acts, re-
waiDll Rllbject to regulat.ion for thl' health, safety and general 
1I'elfare. For example, a legi:dative determination that 
monogamy is the "law of social life " has been held to prevail 
over the prac:tice of polygamy and bigamy as a duty required, 
elll'ouraged or suffered by religion. (Reynolds v. United 
States, supra, 98 U.S. 145; DatJis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 
[10 S.Ot. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637] ; CletJeland v~ United States, 329 
U.S. 14 [67 S.Ot. 13,91 L.Ed. 12].) 
·1'he reasoning behind this construction of the Constitution 
is obvious. The determination of proper standards of be-
havior must be left to the Congress or to the state legislatures 
ill order that the well being of society as a whole. may be safe-
guarded or promoted. The protection of the individual'. 
exercise of religious worship afforded by our state Constitu-
tion, article I, section 4, corresponds with that furnished by 
the federal guaranty as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Oourt. Our Constitution expressly provides that 
the free exercise of religion guaranteed "shall not be so con-
strued as to • _ • justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
or safety of this State." 
Moreover, the right of the state to exercise extensive control 
over the marriage contract has always been recognized. The 
institution of matrimony is the foundation of society, and the 
community at large has an interest in the maintenanc:e of its 
integrity and purity. (Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Oal. 1 [16 P. 
345]; 16 Cal.Jur. 909.) The Supreme CoUrt of the United 
States has stated: "Marriage, as ereating the most important 
relat.ion in life, as having more to do with the morals and 
eivili7.ation of a people than any other institution, has always 
been Rubject to the control of the legislature." (Maynard v. 
HiU, 125 U.S. 190, 205 [8 S.Ot. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654].1 And: 
"M.-uTiage, while from itR very nature a sacred obligation, is 
nevertheless, in most civilized nntionR, a civil contract, and 
usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be 
built, and out of ibl fruits spring social relations and social 
obImntions and dutie!'>. with whieh government is necessarily 
rt:quir(.,a to deal." (Rc1molds v. Unitf'd States, npra, 98 
U$. 145, 165.) In the language of the Supreme Oourt of 
Millt:Onri: "The right to regulate marri8.fle. the age at which 
p,'rRons may enter into that relation, the IQanner in whieh 
the ritf'~ may be c('Jebrnted, and. the pel'ROns betwel'n whom it 
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civilized and Cbric;tilln nation." (State v. Jackstm, 80 Mo. 
175, 179 [50 Am.Rep. 499].) ~'urther: "There can be no 
doubt R.C; to the power of every country to make Jaws regulat-
ing the mnrriage of its own subjects; to declare who may 
m:lrry, how they may marry, and what shall be the legal con-
l'iI.'IJuenee8 of their marrying. The right to regulate the insti-
tution of marriage; to cl81i18ify the parties and persons who 
lllay lawfully marry; to dissolve the relation by divorce; and 
to impose such restraints upon the relation as the laws of 
God, and the laws of propriety, morality and social order de-
mand, has been exercised by all civilized governments in all 
ages of the world." (Kinney v. The CommonwcaZfh, 30 Gratt. 
(Va.) 858,862 (32 Am.Rep. 690].) 
It is apparent from what has been ..mid that if the law under 
attack bears a substantial relationship to the health, safety, 
morals or lOme other phase of the general welfare of the ptlople 
of this state, it would not be invalid because ineidentally in 
conflict with the conduct and practice of a particular religious 
group. Similarly if there is a rational basis for the law, if 
it is reasonable, and all within a given class are· treated alike, 
there is no violation of the due process or equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. (See Missouri ez rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U.S. 337 (59 S.Ct. 232,83 L.Ed. 208]; Buck v. B6lZ, 274 U.S ... 
200 [47 S.Ct. 584,71 L.Ed. 1000]; Radice v. New York, 264 
U.S. 292 (44 S.Ct. 325, 68 L.Ed. 690]; Pafson6 v. Pennsyl-
vania, 232 U.S. 138 (34 S.Ct. 281, 58 L.Ed. 539] ; Noble 8fafe 
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 [31 S.Ct. 186,55 L.Ed. 112].) 
The prohibition of miscegenetic marriage is not a recent 
innovation in this state nor is such a law by any means unique 
among the states. A short history of miscegenetic marriage 
laws in this state and elsewhere will contribute to a better 
understanding of the problem at hand. A law declaring mar-
riages between white persons and Negroes to be illegal and 
void was enacted at the first session of our Legislature. (Stats. 
1850, ch. 140, p. 424.) Section 60 of the Civil Code declaring 
certain marriages im'alid has existed since t.he advent of our 
codes ill 1872, at which time it extended only to intermarri:w,e 
between wbite persons and Negroes or mulattoes. It succeeded 
the prohibition against sucb marriages found in thE' above-
mentioned statutes of 1850. Section 60 was amended in 1905 
to include marriages between wllitE' persons tlnci Mongolians 
(Stats. 1905, p.554). ThE' provisions of tile law here at-
/ 
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tacked have remained unchallenged for nearly one hundred 
years and have been unchanged so far as the marria~e of 
whites with Negroes is concerned. To indicate that the sub-
ject matter is not merely of ancient legislative conRideration 
it should be noted that in 1933 the District Court of App~u.l 
decided that sections 60 and 69 did not prohibit the marriage 
in this state of a white woman and a Filipino-a member of 
the Malay race (lfIJ'./a/l v. Los Angeles County, 129 Ca1.App. 
267 [18 P.2d 706J). That case was decided on January 27, 
1933. Without delay the Legislature amended both sections 
to extend the prohibition to marriages also as between white 
persons and members of the Malay race. The amendatory 
measures passed both houses of the Legislature and were 
signed by the governor on April 20th of the same year (Stats. 
1933, p. 561) thus rendering nugatory the decision in the 
Roldan case-which was the obvious purpose of the legisla-
tion. As above indicated the present concern with the legis-
lation is only as it affects marriages between white persons 
and Negroes. 
Twenty-nine states in addition to California have similar 
laws. (Rhodes," Annullment of Marriage" (1945); Charles 
S. Manguin, Jr., "The Legal Status of the Negro" (1940).) 
Six of these states have regarded the matter to be of such 
importance that they have by constitutional enactments pro-
hibited their legislatures from passing any law legalizing mar-
riage between white persons and Negroes or mulattoes. Sev-
eral states refuse to recognize such marriages even if per-
formed where valid (see Charles S. Manguin, Jr., "The Legal 
Status of the Negro" (1940); In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 
Mont. 490 [129 P.2d 217J), particularly if an attempt has 
been made by residents of a state to evade the law (Eggers v. 
Olson, 104 Okla. 297 [231 P. 483] ; 8tate v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 
251 [22 Am.Rep. 683). The infrequency of such unions is 
perhaps the chief reason why prollibitive laws are not found 
in the remaining states. (Reuter. "Race Mixture" (1931), 
p. 39; Rhodes, "Annullment of Marriage" (1945), pp. 101, 
102.) 
The ban 011 mixed marriages ill this country is traceable 
from the early colonial period. For example, Maryland for-
bade the prat'tice of marring'l' union!': hetween ~l'groes or 
Inllians and white persons as early n,,, ] 663. Laws forbidding 
marriai!es between Negroes and whitt's werl" passed in Massa-
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aud in North Carolina in 1741. In 1724, it was dc('rera in 
Prance that no Negro-white marriages wcre to takt' placoc in 
Luuisiana. Most of the remaining stat,*, enactcl! siJllilnr 
It:gislation ill the period between the formation of the United 
Statc.<; aud the Civil War. 
Research has not disclosed a single case where a misce-
genetic marriage law has been declared invalid. As stated 
in Estate of Monks, 48 Cal.App.2d 603, 612 [120 P.2d 167] : 
• 'Many states have statutes prohibiting such alliances, and 
we have had presented no instance of successful constitu-
tional attacks upon them or any of them." Not only the 
state courts but the federal courts as well have uniformly 
su~tained the validity of such laws. One of the most rp-ecnt 
decisions upon the subject is that of the Unite.l StatE'S Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the lOth Circuit in the case of 
Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 123, decided DeC~1I1-
ber 18, 1944. The court there said: .. Section 12 [Title 43, 
Oklahoma St. 1941], making unlawful marriages between 
persons of African descent and persons of other races or 
descents is challenged on the ground that it violates the Fo\~r­
teenth Amendment. Marriage is a consentient covenant. It 
is a contract in the sense that it is enteredo into by agreement 
of the parties. But it is more than a civil contract between 
them, subject to their will and pleasure in respect of effects, 
continuance, or dissolution. It is a domestic relation having 
to do with the morals and civilization of a people. It is an 
essential institution in every well organized society. It 
affects in a vital manner public welfare, and its Clllltrol and 
regulation is a matter of domestic concern within each state. 
A state h.u; power to prescribe by law the age at which per-
sons may enter into marriage, the procedure essential to 
const:tute a valid marriage, the duties and obligations which 
it creates, aud its effect upon the property rights of both 
parties. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 [8 s.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 
654]. And within the range of permissible adoption of 
policies deemed to be promotive of the welfare of society as 
well as the individual members thereof, a state is empowered 
to forbid marriages between persons of African desct!nt and 
persons of other races or descentso Such a statute dlit'S not 
contravene th(' Fourteenth Amendment. " 
In Pace v. Ala!Jama, 106 U.S. 503 [1 S.Ct. (j37, 27 J;']~d. 
207], the United States Supreme Court had befnre it " 
statute of the State of Alabama declaring that "if any white 
person and any negro ... intermarry or live ill adultery or 
.; 
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fornication witL each ot.her, 1';lI"h of thelll lIlllst, 011 cOll\"ietioll, 
be imprisoned in tlll' pellih'lIt iary or Sl'ntclwcd to hard lahor 
for the county for not Ie,,!> than two nor more than seven 
years. " A Negro DIan and white woman had been conviet.('d 
in the courts of Alabama of fornication. Upon writ of error 
to the rnited States Supreme Court it was contended that 
the statute was in conflict with the equal protection of law 
clause of thc United States Constitution because ~reHtl'r 
punishment was provided than by another Jaw relatin~ to 
the same offense committed by peoples of the same race. The 
Supreme Court of the United States in upholding the statute 
and affirming the judgment of conviction stated: "1'he 
defect in the argument of counsel consists in bis assumption 
that any discrimination is made by the laws of Alabama in 
the punishment provided for the offense for which the plain-
tiff in error was indict('d when committed by a person of the 
African race and when committed by 8 white person. The 
two sections of the code cited are e:Qtirely consistent. The 
one prescribes, generally, a punishment for an offenst' ('om-
mitted between persons of different sexes; the other pre-
scribes a punishment for an offense which can only be com-
mitted where the two sexes arE' of different races .... What-
ever discrimination is made in the punishment presrribE'o 
in the two sections is directed against the offense designated 
and not against the person of any particular color or race. 
The punishment of each offending person, whether'white or 
black, is the same. " 
In State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753 [7 L.R.A. 50], where a statute 
was held not in deprivation of rights under the federal 
Constitution, it was said: "The court will not disc-uss the 
argtunent of defendantl;' counsel to the effect that the inter-
marriages of whites and blacks do not constitute an evil or 
an injury against which the state should protect itself. This 
is a question which has been, ag we have seen, the subject of 
repeated judicial deliverances; but it is more properly, in 
the opinioll of this court, within the range of legislative duty. 
It is enough, for the purpost> of its duty, for the court to 
ascertain tllat by a legitimate and st>ttJed policy the Stll1t~ 
of Georgia has declared such marriages unlawful and void; 
for while, in this country, the home life of the people. th",ir 
decency and their morality, are the bases of that vast ROcial 
strul'ture of liberty, and obediencE' to law. which exriteli ThE' 
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world, and while these attributes of 0111' citizenship ahoTlld 
be cberishrd and protectl'd by all in authority, and the 
creaturcs who defy them should be condemned by all, thE' 
courts, in their judicial functions, are rarely concerned with 
the policy of the laws which are made to protect the com-
munity. The policy of the state upon this subject has been 
declared, as we have seen, by it.s supreme court as well as by 
its statutes, and it is enough to say that this court is unable 
to discover anything in that policy with which the federal 
courts have the right or the power to interfere." 
In Scott v. State of Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, the Supreme Court 
of Georgia said of a provision of the state Constitution pro-
hibiting marriages between whites and Negroes, and declar-
ing nIl such marriages void: "With the policy of this law 
we have nothing to do. It is our duty to declare what the 
law is, not t.o make law. For myself, however. I do not hesitate 
to say thnt it was dictated by wise statt'smanship, and has a 
broad and solid foundation in enlightened policy, sustained by 
sound reason and common sense. The amalgamation of the 
rac~s is not only unnatural, but is always productive of 
deplorable results. . . . The power of the Legislature over 
the !'Iubject matter when the Code was adopted, will not, I 
suppose, be questioned. The Legislature certainly had as 
much right to regulate the marriage relation by prohibiting 
it between persons of different races as they had to prohibit 
it between persons within the Levitical degrees, or between 
idiots. Both are necessary and proper regulations. And 
the rl:'p.'ulation now under consideration is equally so. " 
In State v. Jackson, 81lpra (80 Mo. 175), the Supreme 
Court of Missouri reversed a judgment sustaining a demurrer 
to an indictment charging a white woman with violation of a 
Htatute making marriages between white persons and Negroes 
a felony. The court said that the law might" interfere with 
the tastes of negroes who want to marry whites, or whites 
who "'ish to intermarry with negroes, but the State has the 
same right to regulate marriage in this respect that it has to 
forbid the intermarriage of cousins and ot.her blood relations. 
If the St.ate desires to preserve the purity of the African 
blood by prohibiting intermarriage between whitt's And 
blacks, we know of no power on earth to prevl'nt such legis-
lation. It is a matter of purely domestic concern. The 14th 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States ... has 
no such scope as set'ms to haY(> been accorded it by the C'iT'('uit 
court .... AU of one's rights as a citizE'n of the United States 
) 
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will be found guaranteed by the Constitution of the Unitcd 
States. If any provision of that instrument confers upon 
a citizen the right to marry anyone who is willing to wed 
him, our attention has not been called to it. If BUC}l be one 
of the rights attached to American citizenship all our marriage 
acts forbidding intermarriage between persons within certain 
degrees of consanguinity are void ... IT]he condition of a 
community, moral, mental and physical, which would toler-
ate indiscriminate intermarriage for several generations, 
would demonstrate the wisdom of laws which regulate mar-
riage and forbid the intermarriage of those nearly related 
in blood." 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Egge"s v. Olson, supra 
(104 Okla. 297 [231 P. 483, 486]), said: "The inhibition, 
like the incestuous marriage, is in the blood, and the reason 
for it is stronger still." The court quoted from 18 R.C.L., 
section 31, p. 409, in part, as follows: ". Civilized society 
has the power of self preservation, and, marriage being the 
foundation of such society, most of the states in which the 
negro forms an element of any note have enacted laws 
inhibiting intermarriage between the white and black races 
... Statutes forbidding intermarriage by the white and black 
races were without doubt dictated by wise statesmanship, 
and have a broad and solid foundation in enlightened policY, 
sustained by sound reason and common sense. The amal-
gamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always 
productive of deplorable results. Tbe purity of the public 
morals, the moral and physical development of both races, 
and the highest advancement of civilization, under which 
the two races must work out and accomplish their destiny, 
all require that they should be kept distinctly separate, and 
that connections and alliances so unnatural should be pro-
hibited by positive law and subject to no evasion.' " 
The miscegenation law of our neighboring state of Oregon 
(Ore. L., § 2163) was held valid by the Supreme Court of that 
state in In"e Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393 r200 P. 911J. In so 
holding the court directed attention to 8 R.C.L. section 381 
where it is said: "Miscegenation is a purely statutory offense, 
consisting in the intermarriage of a person of the white race 
with a negro or colored person. Most states in which the 
negro or colorf'd people form an appreciable element have 
enactt"d tht"se laws inhibiting intermarrying betwef'n the 
w}litt· :mo blaek rRf°(,S. Rnn thl' ofi('ns(' t!ll'l"eby creatt'iI is 
Uf;l1al1y of tIll' g"l"rHlp (If II f(·l()n~·. Thl'rf' ('an b(' no doubt as 
J 
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to the power of overy country to make laws reglllatmg tC\e 
marriagt' of its own subjects j to dedare whn may Illarry, flow 
they may marry, and what shall be the legal conse4uences 
of their marrYing j and accordingly, although miscegenati.)n 
statntes have been persistently attacketl on the grlllllul that 
they are violative of the United States Constitutioll, they 
have been universally upheld as a proper exercise of the 
power of each state to control its own citizens." (See also 
36 Am.Jur., lfiscegenation, § S.) 
The foregoing views are representative of the general tenor 
of judicial opinion which has been expressed elsewhere. 
Without further amplification reference may be malle to 
CaReS in Arizona (8tate v. PlUS (1942),59 Ariz. 16 [121 P.2d 
882]; Kirby v. Kirby (1922), 24 Ariz. 9 [206 P. 405]), in 
Colorado (JooksO'n v. City and County of Dentler (1942), 
109 Colo. 196 [124 P.2d 240]), in Montana (In re Taka-
lu£shi's ERtate, supra, (19-:12), 113 Mont. 490 [129 P.2d 217] 
-,Tnpanese-White), in Alabama (Green v. State (1877), 58 
AIn. 190 [29 Am.Rep. 739]), in Virginia (Kinney v. The 
Commo-nwruZth, supra (1878), 30 Gratt. 858 [32 Am.Rep. 
690]), in Indiana (StGte v. O1oson (1871), 36 Ind. 389 
[10 Am.Rep. 42]), in Arkansas (Doclsonv. State (1895), 
61 Ark. 57 [31 S.W. 977]), in Texas (PrlUher v. State (1tl77), 
3 Tcx.App. 263 [30 Am.Rep. 131]), in Tennessee (LnnlU v. 
Stflte (1871), 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287), in Pennsylvania 
(Philad.elphitJ ct West Chester R. R. Co. v. Miles, 2 AmLaw 
Rev. 358). 
The foregoing authorities form an unbroken line of judi-
cial l'I1lpport, both ~tute and federal, for the validity of our 
own l('.rl~Intion, :\lld there is none to the contrary. Those 
nuthoritit'S :lppC:lr to hnvepassed upon all attacks on ,",'Uch 
Jo{rl.'1L'1t.ion on con.'1titutiollnl grounds, but notwithstallding 
t.heir unanimity it i"l decL'1red by some of the majority that 
t.hllre is n ~rt of racinl discriurlnntion whlch solely formed 
the bn.'1is for the enactments and by :mother of the majority 
that the con:::titutional guarantee of frcedom of religi(1D has 
been infrin~ed. However, it is the law that if there is R())Ue 
factual background for the legislation, that circumstance 
forms an appropriate reason for the enactments, and it is 
then proper to consider the rules of law which govern the 
courts in that connection. 
In passing upon the "Illidity of any statutory enactmf:nt 
the power of tIle courts is not unlimited. It is circumscribed 







Oct. 1948] PEREZ V. SHARP 
[32 C.2d 711: 188 P.2d 17) 
'153 
case are: that all prE'sumptions and intendments are in fn,",or 
of the constitutionality of a statute; that all doubts are to 
be resolved in favor of and not against the validity of a 
statute; that before an act of a coordinate branch of our 
government can be declared im'slid by the courts for the 
rE'ason that it is in conflict with the Constitution, such con-
flict must be clear, positive and unquestionable; that in the 
case of any fair, reasonable doubt of its constitutionality the 
statute should be upheld, and th~ doubt be resolved in favor 
of the expressed will of the Legislature; that it is also to be 
presumed that the Legislature acted with integrity' and with 
a purpose to keep within the restrictions and limitations laid 
down in the fundamental law; that when the constitutionality 
of a statute depends on the existence of some fact or state of 
facts, the determination. thereof is primarily for the Legis-
lature and the courts will acquiesce therein unless' the con-
trary clearly appears; that the enactment of the statute 
implies, and the conclusive presumption is, that the Governor 
and the members of the Legislature have performed their 
duty, and havp ascertained the existence of facts justifying 
or requiring the legislation; that this is true even in the 
absence of an express finding of those facts embodied. in the 
act; and that the courts may not question or review the legis-
lative determination of the facts. (5 Ca1.Jur., p. 628 et seq., 
and the many cases there cited.) These presumptions apply 
with particular emphasis to statutes passed in the exercise 
of the police power (11 Am.Jur., p. 1088, and many cases 
cited). 
A recent statement by t.his court reco~izes the generlll rule. 
In In ,.e Porterfield, 28 Ca1.2d 91, 103 [168 P.2d 706, 167 
A.L.R. 675], with supporting authorities, it is said: .. Con-
stitutionality of purpose and appliclltion is gcnerRlly to be 
presumed. It has often bf'en said that it is only wh~n it 
clearly appears that,:m ordinance or !'Itatutc pa'~"~ definitely 
beyond the limits which bound thc police power nnd infrinA'~ 
npon rights securpd by the fundamental law, that it should 
bE' declared void." 
Pertinent to the immpdiate question is GaZeener v. Honey-
c'U,tt. 173 CIll. 100. 104 [159 P. 595]. This court there approved 
th(' doctrine announccd in f'!Rrlicr CMes. It was sRid that it 
had never since been qUt'st.iont'd t.hat, when the right to enact 
a hlW dcp('nd<.: upon the ~xj~t~n(',e of a fRct, the pRRSRge of the 











'154 PERU 11. SHA.BP [32 C.2d 
exi:.;hlnce of the {Ilet ha.<; bel'n ft.«<:crtained by the legislative 
body. (SccnlHo Itt rt Spcttcer, 149 Cal. 396, 400 l86 P. 896, 
117 Am.St.u.cp. 137, 9 Ann.Cas. 1105); Jlartin v. Superior 
Court, 194 Cn!. 93, 101 [227 P. 762J ; Pacific Go.s & Elcc. Co. v. 
Moore, 37 Cal.App.2d 91, 95 [98 P.2d 819].) 
It is not within the province of the courts to go behind the 
findings of the Legislature and determine that conditions did 
not cx~t which gave rise to and justified the enactment. Only 
when, beyond reasonable doubt, all rational men would agree 
thnt the fuctulll background did not warrant the enactment 
of H statute which was ostensibly designed to preserve the 
general welfare can we say that a statute if! arbitrary and 
capricious. (In rl' Mill(lr, 162 Cal. 687 [124 P. 427] ; People Y. 
Georgf,,42 Cal.App.2d 568 [109 P.2d 404].) It is a well settled 
rule of constitutional exposition, that if a statute mayor may 
. not be, according to the circumstances, within the limits of 
legislative authority, the existence of the circumstances neces-
sary to support it must be presumed. (Sweet v. Beckel, 159 
U.S. 380,393 [16 S.Ct. 43, 40 L.Ed. 188].) When a question 
of fact is debated and debatable. and the extent to which a 
special constitutional limitation should be applied is under 
consideration, the conclusion JDay properly be influenced by a 
widespread and long continued belief concerning it, and 
thho is within judicial cognizance. (Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412, 421 [28 S.Ct. 324; 52 L.Ed. 551].) 
The Legislature is, in the first instance, the judge of what 
is neCla.ssary for the public welfare. Earnest conflict of opinion 
maket; it especially a question for the Legislature and not 
for the courts. (Erie B. B. Co. Y. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 699, 
'101 [34 S.Ct. 761, 58 L.Ed. 1155], citing other cases.) "It is 
eSb\blisbed that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, 
if :my state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would 
su."t:un it, and the existence of that state· of facts at the time 
the law was enacted must be assumed .... It makes no 
difference that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed 
by ar/lUment and opinion of serious strength. It is not within 
the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety. 
• • . And it is not required that we . . . be convinced of the 
wisdom of the legislation." {Bo.st v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 
240 U.S. 342, 357, 365-366 (36 S.Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679], citing 
cases.) "We need not labor the point, long st>ttled, that where 
le~islative action is within the Roope· of the police power, 
fairly ddm1nble ql1esti()n~ as to its reasonableness, wisdom 
anti propl'it'ly nre not for thl~ uetermination of the courts, but 
/ 
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for thnt of tlw )c~islltt.iv\· oo(ly on which resbl the duty and 
responsihilit.y of dl'cisioll .... W c llIny not tURt in the bAlances 
of judieial review till' weight and sufficiency of the facbl to 
sustain the conclusion of the legh;lative body ... " (Standard 
Oil Co. v. Mary.willa, 279 U.S. 582, 584, 586 [49 S.Ot. 430, 
73 L.Ed. 8561, and cited cases.) Underlying questions of 
fact which may condition the constitutionality of legislation 
carry with them the presumption of constitutionality in the 
absence of some factual foundation of record for overtbrowin~ 
the statute. (O'Gorman cf Young v. Hartford F. 1m. Co., 
282 U.S. 251, 257-258 [51 S.Ct. 130, 75 L.Ed. 324].) 
Again the United States Supreme Court has reiterated in 
Borden', F. P. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, at pagl~ 209 
[55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281] : "When the classification made 
by the legislature is called in question, if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is n 
presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one 
who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing 
by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which may 
be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that the 
action is arbitrary. . . . The principle that the StatE> has a 
broad discretion in classification, in the exercise of its power 
of regulation, is constantly recognized by this Court." (People 
v. Western Fruit Growers, 22 Cal.2d 494, 506-508 [140 P.2d 
13]; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 106, 122 [116 
P. 557] ; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. County of Los Angel-es, 160 
Cal. 129 [116 P. 566].) Whether the legislation is wise or un-
wise as a matter of policy is a question with which the courts 
are not concerned. (Home Bldg. cf L. Assn. v. BlaisdeU, 290 
U.S. 398, 447-448 [54 8.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R.1481].) 
Courts are neither peculiarly qualified nor organized to de-
termine the underlying questions of fact with reference to 
which the validity of the legislation must be determined. 
Differing ideas of public policy do not properly concern 
them. The courts have no power to determine the merits of 
conflicting theories, to conduct an investigation of facts bear-
ing upon questions of public policy or expediency, or to sus-
tain or frustrate the legislation according to whether they 
happen to approve or disapprove the legislative determina-
tion of such qnestions of fact. (Norman v. Baltimore cf O. R. 
Co., 294 U.S. 240 [55 S.Ct. 407,79 L.Ed. 885,95 A.L.R. 1352], 
affirming 265 N.Y. 37 [191 N.E. 726, 92 A.L.R. 1523]; 11 
Am.Jur. pp. 823, 824, and cases cited; see article, "JudiciaZ 
; 
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Dctl'rmination of Qucstionsof Fact Affeoting the Constitu 
tional Validity of Legislative Action," 38 Harv.L.Rev. 6.) 
The fllct that the finding of th~ Legislature is in favor of the 
truth of one sidt: of a matter as to which there is still room for 
d.i1ferenct: of opinion is not material. What the people's 
legislativ~ represtmtatives believe to be for the public good 
must be accepted as tending to promote the public welfare. 
It has been said that any other basis would conflict with the 
spirit of the Constitution and would sanction !lleasures op-
posed to a republican form of government. (Atlantic Coast 
.uno B. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 [34 S.Ct. 829, 58 L.Ed. 
1312] ; 'Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235 [72 N.E. 97, 103 Am. 
St.Rep. 859, 1 Ann.Cas. 334, 70 L.R.A. 796]; State ex rel. 
Sullivan v. Dammann, 227 Wis. 72 [277 N.W. 687] ; Stettler 
v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519 [139 P. 743, Ann.Cas. 1916A 217, 
L.R.A. 1917C 944], affirmed 243 U.S. 629 [37 S.Ct. 475, 61 
L.Ed.937].) 
Text and authorities which constitute the factual basis for. 
the legislative finding involved in the statute here in question 
indicate only that there is a difference of opinion as to the 
wisdom of the policy underlying the enactments. 
Some of the factual considerations which the Legislature 
could have taken into consideration are disclosed by an 
examination of the sources of information on the biological and 
sociological phases of the problem and which may be said 
to form a background for the legislation and support the 
reasoning found in the decisions of the courts upholding simi-
lar statutes. A reference to a few of those sources of informa-
tion will suffice. 
On the biological phase there is authority for the conclusion 
that the crossing of the primary races leads gradually to 
retrogression and to eventual extinction of the resultant type 
unles.c; it is fortified by reunion with the parent stock. (W. A. 
Dixon, M. D., Journal of Ameriean Medical Association, vol. 
20, p.1 (1893) ; Frederick L. Hoffman, statistician, Prudential 
Life Insurance Co. of America, American Economics Associa-
tion, vol. 11 (1896) "Race Traits and Tendencies of the 
American Negro"; C. E. W oodruif, "The Expansion of 
lli\Cf'S" (1909).) In September. 1927, in an article entitled, 
"ltace Mixture," which appeared in "Science," volume 66, 
-~ X, Dr. Charles B. Davenport of the Carnegie Foundation 
of Washington, Department of Experimental Evolution, said: 
"In the absence of any unifornl rule 8S to consequences of race 
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in thl' Hawaiian-Chinese crosses, it clearly produce...; supcrior 
progeny," and that th~ Negro-white and Filipino-Europcnn 
crosses do not seem to fallv.ithin the exception. 
In volUlllt! 19 of the Encyclopedia Arueric.'UuL (1924), PIWC 
275, it is I!iIlid: "The result'J of racial inter1U~e have huen 
exceedingly variable. Sometimes it has produced a better 
race. This is the Cl.'\Se when the crossing has been between 
different but closely allied stocks .... Prof. U. G. Weatherly 
writes: 'It is an unquestionable fact that the yellow, :u; well 
as the negroid peoples possess many desirable qualities in 
which the whites are de1icient. From this it has been argued 
that it would be advanta,..noeous if all races were blended into 
a universal type embodying the excellencies of each. But 
scientific breeders have long ago demonstrated thtlt the most 
dt$kahle results are secnred by specialiY.ing types rather thaD 
by merging them. 
" 'The color line is evidence of an attempt, based on instinc-
tive choice, to preserve those distinctive values which a racinl 
group hns come to regard as of the highest moment to itself.' " 
In an addresg before the Commonwealth Club of California 
on July 9, 1948, Mr. William Gemmill, South African dele-
gate to the International Labor Organization and one well 
acquainted with social conditions and sociological manifesta-
tions in that continent, made the stateJ.Qent that in South 
Africa, where the European population is greatly outnumbered 
by the natives, both cl81:1Ses are adamunt in opposition to 
intermarriage and that the free mixing of all the races could 
in fact ouly lower the general level. 
A collection of data and references on the result of misce-
genation is found in "The Meuace of Color" (1925) by J. W. 
Gregory (F.R.S., D.Se., Professor of Geology in the Univer,nty 
of Glasgow). On PBbre 227 he says that the intermixtures which 
have bl-oen bcneficial to the progress of mankind have been be-
tween nearly related peoples and that the. results of a mixture 
of v.idcly divergent &took serve to W:&l'Il against the misccgelll\-
tion of dil.-tinct races. Dr. J. A. Mjoen of the Windercn Labora-
tory, Norw:ty, js credited by Professor Gregory (at p. 229) 
with the conclusion from special studies that the evidence is 
sufficient to call for immediat~ action &V:1in.crt the intermarriage 
of '?tidcly dit.1inct races. Gregory st.'1tes that where two !'uch 
rtlCes :u-e in contact the inferior qu:ilities nre not bred out, but 
may be umph:u:v,cd in the progeny, a principle widely ex-
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the unfortunate result!) of croSlilings between dissimilar races, 
including the American Negro-white, are ascribed by t.he 
author to Prof. H. Lundborg (1922); E. D. Cope, American 
geologist; Elwang (1904); Prof. N. S. Shaler (1904); Emile 
GaborillU and Gustav Le Bon, France; F. L. Holfman of the 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America (1923); Prof. A. E. 
JenkKj and Herbert Spencer (1892). 
In March, 1926, the Carnegie Institution of W a.~hinlrton, 
D. C., Accepted u gift from one who expressed his intcreflt 
in tho problem of race eros. .. inl!' with special reference to its 
&{rnificl1ncc for the future of any country containinJ!' n 
mixed population. The work wa..~ undertaken by th~ Depart-
ment. of Genetie::, Carnegie Institution. An advisory com-
mittoe W:l.~ orf!'anized . con. .. istinp; of W. V. Bin$!"ham, Charles 
B. Davenport, E.L. Thorndike, I:Uld Clark Wis.<der. )fr. 
Morri .. StegJ!'erda wa.~ selected a~ field investil?ator. Mr. Steg-
flCl'da had had excellent training in genetic!! and psychology, 
I:Uld had shown u marked fitne.CIS for the st.udy and analysis 
of the individual. The main project was carried out in 
JamruC:l, B.W.I., by studying in detail and comparatively, 
100 each of adult!;; of full-blooded Negroell (Blacks), EuropeaM 
(Whit.cH), and White-Black mh:turesof all degrees (BroWn). 
Half of the hundred were of each Flex. In addition to the main 
project some 1,200 children of school and preschool age were 
observed and measured. Finally in 1929, an extensive report 
w:to; published by the Carnegie Institution, in book form 
entitled "Race Crossing in Jaru~Lica," by B. C. Davenport and 
Morri:. Stc~~crda, in collaboration with others. The results 
of their investiaation indicated th:1t the crouing of distinct 
rOO(~ ie; biolomcally undl~irable lmd should be disco11rftged. 
W. E. Ca. . tle, BUH:ley In. .. titution, Harvard University, in 
an article entitled "Biologicul and SocW. CoJlSequenccs of 
Race CrOS!;insr," printed in volume 9, Ameri~"Lll Jo11l'DlL1 of 
Physical Anthropology (April, 1926), Btatea on page 152: 
"If all inheritance of human traitR were aimple Mendeli:m 
inheritance, and natural selections were unlimited in ita 
action amonl? human populations, then UJll'eIItricted raciAl 
int.ercrossiIij! min-ht be recommended. But in the light of our 
pre.~l!nt knowlcdS!e, few would recommend it. For, in the 
first plncc, much that to; best in hUDIRD existence is :i matter of 
social illheritaJll~l', not of biological inbcritanoo. Race C1'O*ings 
disturb socinl inberitnnc<.-. Tw&t is one of its worst features." 
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The writings of Father John La FllJ'ge, S .• J., are typical of 
many who have considered thr' !)uhjef't of raee-crosses from 
a sociological stand poi lit. H('fer(')wl' has been made to his 
work" The Race Question and the 1':egro" (1943). Under the 
heading "The Moral Aspect," he writes: "[TJhere are grave 
reasons against any general practice of intermarriage between 
the members of different racial groups. 'fhese reasons, where 
clearly verified, amount to a moral prohibition of such a 
practice . 
.. These arise from the great difference of condition which 
is usually experienced by the members of the rl'Spective 
groups. It is not merely a difference of poverty or rich~s, 
of lesser or greater political power, but the fact that identifi-
cation with the given group is far-reaching and affects innu-
merable aspects of ordinary daily life. . . . 
"'Vhere marriage is contracted by entire solitaries, such nn 
interracial tension is more easily borne, but few persons ma-
trimonially inclined are solitaries. They bring with them into 
the orbit of married life their parents and brothers and 
sisters and uncles and aunts and the entire socinl circle in 
which they revolve. All of these are a1Tcctcd by the socinl 
tension, which in turn reacts upon the pence and unity of the 
marriage bond. 
&< Wheu children enter the scene the difficulty is further 
complicated unless a complete and entirely self-sacrificing-
understanding has been reached beforehand. And even then 
the social effects may be beyond their control. . . . 
"In point of facts as the Negro group b~ollles culturally 
advallced, there appenrs llO corresponding tendency to seek 
intermarriage with other races." 
'fhe foregoing excerpts from scientific articles and leg"ru 
authorities make it clear that there is not only some but a 
great deal of evidcnce to support the legislative determin:ttion 
(lust made by our Legislature in 1933) that intermarri~e 
between Negroes and whitt'! persons is incompatible with the 
general welfare and thertlfore a proper subject for regulation 
under the police power. Thcre may be some who maintain 
that there does not exist adequate duta on a sufficiently lar(!c 
scale to enable a decision to be made as to the effects of tht'! 
original ndmixture of whitc nnd Ncg-ro blood. However, lc~is­
lnt~rs are not required to wait upon the completion of scil!n-
tific rc~enreh to determine whether the undl!rlyin~ bcts carry 
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J.\ review of the ~ubject indicates th:.t.t the !;htutory cl:\SSi-
fic:ttiull W:IS deterwiul'u by the Lcgi:;lature in the li~ht of all 
the <:irculll~tauecs Ilud requireulCnts (see ruso CuUfurlliu Phy-
Sit:ifInS' Sf'Tl:ic;e v. Garrison, 28 Ca1.2d 790, 802 [172 P.~d 4, 
167 A.L.R. 306] ; Livingston v. Roll·inson, 10 Ca1.2d 730 [76 
P.2d 119::l]) ; that under our tripartite system of govcrnment 
this court lllay not. substitute its judgment for that of the 
Lcgislaturt! as to the nccel'Sity for th,' cn:lCtlllcut whcrl' it. 
Wa.s, as hc:rr, based lIpon cxistiug cOllditiom. aud scientific 
data and Ll'lic:f; that. eYen in the field of fundamental rights 
it has always be,'ll rccol,.'llized thnt where the Legislature has 
npprnispd a particular situation nnd found a specific condi-
tion su1'fich'lltly important to justify re~ulation, such deter-
mination is giveu great weight when the law is challenged 
on coru;titutional grounds. 
ThoS(' favoring present day amalgamation of these distinct 
rac •• g irrt'.Spective of scientific data of a cautionary nature 
b/.&R{·d upon the experience of others, or who feel that a sup-
pOtOcd infrequcncy of interracial unions will minimize unde-
sirable consequences to the point that would jUJo,1ify lifting 
the prohibition upon such unions, should direct their efforts 
to the Legislature in order to effect the chang,! in state policy 
which they espouse-as was done in Massachusetts in 1843, 
Kansas in 18!)!), New Mexico in 1866, WashinJrt,on in 1868, 
Rhon., Island in 1881, Minnesota and Michigan in 1883, and 
Ohin in 1887. 
r.I.'he contention is also advanced that the statute must fall 
before the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment bectlm,;c of lack of a sufficient showing of clear and pros-
ent danl;!cr arising out of an emer/lcncy. The cases relied 
upon nrc Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 [68 S.Ct. 269, 
92 L.Ed. --]; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 
[68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. --] ; Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 
3~6 U.S. 80 [65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072] ; Hirabayashi v. 
Unitfd States, 320 U.S. 81 [63 S.Ct. 1::J75, 87 L.Ed. 1774]; 
M'i'<souri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, supra, 305 U.S. 337; 
WiLUam8 v. IntfJrnational dc. of Hoilermakers, 27 Ca1.2d 586 
[165 P.2d 903] ; and James v. Marinsh'ip Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721 
[lG5 P.2d :129, 160 A.L.R. 900] (sec also Shelley v. Kraemer 
and McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 [68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Rd. 
-] ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 [68 S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed. 
--J ). Thest' cuses, in g-eneral, hold that Ie/lislation discrim-
il1atill~~ <ll!ainst particular persons, or groups of persons be-
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compelling necessity as the 80Urce of enactment. These cases 
bve betan "nnlyzed. They have widely diverJlent factual 
blWkgroUllJs :wd Me not coutrolliug. UI'rl.' thcre is no lack of 
cql1al treatll1t'nt. Seuti\)n.; 60 aud G9 uf our Civil Code do not 
dis(lriminate agaWst Jl"r.rons of either the white or Negro 
l'at"t'8. (PtICll V • .A.l4bfl.fM, ,upra, lOG U.S. !)1S8; J ac'k8nn v. 
Cilyand Cwnl" 0/ DPfwer, ""pf'a, 109 Colo. 196 [124 P.2d 
24.0] ; 1. re PGlJfU'" 1:.t.lte, "'prll, 101 Ore. 393 [200 P. 
911].) Bach petitiout1l' h:bI the right and the privilege of 
marrying within his or her uwn In'uup. The regulation does 
not rest solely upon " difference in race. The question is not 
merely one of difference, nor of superiority or inferiority, 
but of consequence and result. The underlying factors that 
constitute justification for laws against miscegenation closely 
parallel those which SllStain the validity of prohibitions against 
incest and incestuous marri~es (Pen. Code, § 285; Civ. Code, 
§59;42 C.J.S., Incest, §l), and bigamy (Pen. Code, §281; 
Civ. Code, § 61; Daw v. B6tJ8Of&, supra, 133 U.S. 888; B,.."n-
oldl v. U.iled Sial", supra, 98 U.S. 145). Moreover the ar-
gument b~ed upon equal protection does not take into proper 
account the t'.xtensive control the state has always exercised 
ovt'r tha marriage contract, nor of the further fact that at the 
'Very time the Constitution of the United States was being 
formulated miscegen:ltion was cons.idered inimical to the 
public good and was frowned up~>n by the colonies, and con-
tinued to be 80 regarded and prohibited in states having any 
substantial admixture of population at the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted. In view of this fact, and the 
unanimity of judicial decision sustain:in:g such statutes, it 
seems impossible to believe that any constitutional guaranty 
was intended to prohibit this legislation. 
It has been suggested that sections 60 and 69 of the Civil 
Code are unconstitutional because not aufticiently compre-
hensive. More specifically it is said that such legislation does 
not preclude the possibility of progeny as a result of pur-
ported marriages entered into by persons who have con-
cealed or failed to disclose their racial origin, nor the possi-
bility of illegitimate progeny of mixed matings or of issue from 
such ra.cially mixed marriages validly contracted in other 
statt's by residents of this state. HOli'cver it is definitely es-
tablished that the states, in seeking a remedy, are not required 
to extt'nd regulation to all ('aReS which might possibly be 
reached. (Badice v. New York, supra, 264 U~S. 292.) "They 
.I 
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may mark and set apart the classes and type!; of problems 
uccol'lling tl' the needs and as dictatell or IHl}!gt'l;lt'd by expe· 
rience." (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,540 l62 8.Ct. 
1110, 86 L.Ell. 1655]; Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 
[49 S.Ct. 61, 73 L.Ed. 184].) The equal protection clause 
does not prevent the Legislature from recognizing •• degrecs 
of evil." (Tigner v. ~l'exas, 310 U.S. 141 [60 S.Ct. 879, ~4 
L.Ed. 1124] ; 7'ruax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 [36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 
131].) Nor is the Legislature prevented by the equal protec-
tion clause from confining "its restrictions to those classes of 
cases where the need is deemed to be clearest." (Miller v. 
Wilson, 236 U.s. 373, 384 [35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628].) 
"[W]here a given situation admittedly presents a proper 
field for the exercise of the police power the extent of its in-
vocation and application is a matter which lies very largely 
in legislative discretion." (Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 
195 Cal. 497, 514 [234 P. 388].) The need for prohibiting 
all miscegeny, together with administrative impracticalities 
inherent in any such attempt, were proper matters for the 
Legislature to consider. And the fact, if it bea fact, that 
some people contract such marriages within this state illegally, 
or others contract such marriages validly outside the state 
and subsequently reside here, does not lend support to any 
contention of unconstitutionality of the statute. 
Finally, it is argued that sections 60 and 69 are too vague 
and uncertain to constitute valid regulation in that they lack 
definitions of descriptive terms. such as mulatto, and are 
uncertain as to the mode of proof of race. After almost 
100 years of continuous operation of the present and 
preexisting similar laws, the claimed obstacles to the appli-
cation of the statute are more theoretical than real. In any 
event the contention is not a matter for consideration in this 
proceeding. In the application for a marriage license t.he 
petitioner Perez states that she is a white person and the 
petitioner Davis states that he is a Negro. The petition for 
the writ contains allegations of the same facts. Therc is 
thcrefore no indefiniteness in the code sections that cnn avail 
the petitioners; nor is there here any problem of proof. It 
is the well-established rule that a charge of unconstitution-
ality can be raised only in a case where that issue is illvolvl'd 
in the determil1ation of tht' action, and then only by the 
person or a member of the (')aHs of persons adversely affected. 
(American }f'ruit Grown's v. Parker, 22 Ca1.2d 513 [HO r.2d 
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JI'actor <t CO. v. ]lunsrnan, 5 Ca1.2d 446 [5:) P.2tl 177]; People 
v. Globe Graill ({; Mill. Co., 211 Cltl. ]2] l2!l4 P. 31; A. ]1'. 
Estabrook Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 177 Cal. 767 [177 P. 
848 J; Estate of Monks, supra, 48 Cal.App.2d 603, 610-612, 
involving the miscegenation law of Arizona-see also Kirby 
v. Kirby, supra, 24 Ariz. 9 [206 P. 405] j ann State v. Pass. 
supra, 59 Ariz. 16 [121 P.2d 882]-Jackson v. City and 
County of Denvef·, su.pra, 109 Colo. 196 [124 P.2d 240], 
involving a miscegenation statute of that state.) Here there 
is no possible uncertainty in the statute as applied to the 
petitioners. 
The alternative writ should be discharged and the peremp-
tory writ denied. 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J. t concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Oct.ober 
28, 1948. Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for & 
rehearine:. 
